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Changes in Society Affecting Schooling

With some implications for teacher education

It seems clear that we are in the midst of a major change of course for educational institutions. Predicting this change is made the more enigmatic by the recognition that the demographic trough passing through the system is not the only major change in process in our society. Bulcock invites us to consider not only the direct effects on education of such prospects as zero economic growth in addition to zero population growth; he calculates some of the effects of the interactions of these developments on education. Looking ahead to 2030, as educators of that era's work-force ought now to be doing, he draws from the forecast of a radical change in the ratio of dependents (old and young) to work-force in the population, the conclusion for teacher-trainers that our present acceptance of enormous talent-loss among youth going through the system is no longer tolerable. The efforts of teachers must change direction accordingly.

This paper is a speculative essay on the shifting relationships between today's school and society, and on some of their implications for the future of teacher education. Reference is made specifically to Canadian education, though many of the problems and issues identified are common to a majority of the twenty-four members of the exclusive OECD family of nations. They differ largely in their intensity from nation to nation. Thus, structurally the features of the problems tend to be the same — declining student enrolments, increasing educational expenditures in the public household sector despite declining enrolments, and increased bureaucratic growth accompanied by greater uniformity and rigidity in educational operations. Similarly, the complex ways in which these features of national or provincial educational systems interrelate tend to be the same. Educational system differences, then, tend to be differences in terms of the relative strength of the relationships; that is, the parameters of the problems vary depending on a variety of mutations in the ecologies of education across nations.

To illustrate the effects of these factors on teacher education arrangements in Canada it is desirable to make three simplifying assumptions. In the first place the revisionist notion that an educational system may be viewed as an important infrastructural component of the more primary economic and political institutions of a society is considered authentic. Secondly, teacher education institutions, in turn, are viewed as infrastructural components of the educational system as a whole. The third assumption is that the prime movers, though not necessarily the only ones, that determine the impact of social change on teacher education are economic and demographic factors which co-vary; in other words, slower population growth means slower economic growth.

It is easy to show, if the first simplifying assumption is accepted, that at the macro-level — where, for example, school systems are the units of analysis — significant changes in formal schooling arrangements occur largely as a function of changes affecting the economic and political arrangements, and not the other way round. Thus, while not wishing to deny that change is reciprocal — that is, where schooling affects society as well as the reverse — the claim here is that schools are essentially adaptive institutions *vis-à-vis* society rather than instruments of social reform or change. By the same token, while it is not denied that teacher education institutions can affect educational practices for the better, the second simplifying assumption is supportive of a relationship between educational institutions and teacher education in which schooling is perceived as primary and teacher education as predominantly derivative. In the school system and teacher education case, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, it is argued that the most salient operating characteristics of the schools — for example, classroom competition, ability grouping, tracking, custodial care arrangements, and the like — will be accurately reflected by teacher education institutions.

The fact that teacher education is sometimes in the vanguard of educational change, while seemingly contradictory to the second assumption, stems from a mandate for initiating critical inquiry and evaluation of schooling practice. What it is important to note in this connection, however, is that if teacher education institutions tried to reproduce phenomena of which there were few examples in the school system or the wider society, such "inventions" would probably prove unacceptable.

A model

Given these assumptions, we are in a position to assemble a model implicit in the opening sentence to the paper, with the proviso that the model presented is a heuristic one as opposed to one formulated for purpose of empirical test. The co-related source factors or prime movers in the model are demographic and economic changes (reflected in declining birth rates and a slowing down in the rate of economic growth) which as mediated by political institutions are having

profound effects on traditional schooling arrangements. In general, these relationships are proving disjunctive or contradictory. There exists, for example, a serious lack of fit between education and work, as represented by youth unemployment and underemployment. At the last stage of the model all four factors (demographic, economic, political, and educational changes) affect teacher education institutions. Thus, changes occurring in society affect schooling, and both affect teacher education.

It is hypothesized that the relationships are not merely additive but multiplicative. For example, the relationships between demographic changes and schooling may be different for economic systems with different growth rates. Thus, declining birth rates may have a disproportionately greater impact on schooling arrangements in nations where economic growth trends are already heading down the bumpy road leading to zero economic growth (say, England and Italy) than in steady state nations (such as Austria and Canada) or in high growth nations (such as Germany and Japan). Similarly, the relationship between economic changes and schooling may be different for systems with different political parties in power. Multiplier effects may also characterize the school and teacher-education relationship, since schooling effects may be different in countries with different birth rates, and different again for countries with different growth rates. The cumulative impact attributable to multiplier effects may have explosive consequences.

Demographic effects

The dramatic effects of changes in birth rates on Canadian education are attributable to the reversals in post-war trends — from a total fertility ratio of 3.8 in 1959 to one of 1.8 and still dropping in 1976. The shockwave of the post-war population explosion — the baby-boom — is still moving inexorably through the age-graded institutions in society. Obstetricians are waiting in vain for the baby-boom echo forecast by Statistics Canada, whose prescience seems unequal to the task. The surplus educational capacity caused by declining school enrolments is already of embarrassing proportions to educational authorities; partly because the problem is unprecedented, and partly because it goes so much against the grain of a traditional niggardliness in the use of educational facilities, that the question of sharing space with others is as yet "unthinkable."

As the baby-boom cohort moves out of the age-graded public school the competition for students among the post-secondary educational institutions will intensify. Colleges in the same catchment area are already packaging their programs in appealing brochures — watch for the public relations feuds. But as the tail-enders of the baby-boom cohort try to squeeze or force their way into the crowd ahead of them on the labour market, the value to society of education as a sifting device is increasing. Witness the contradiction. On the one hand, as enrolments decline admissions officers will open the doors wider to minimize

disequilibrium between institutional capacity and student enrolment. On the other hand, as the number of openings on a contracting labour market decline, the competition in the university arena for places in the high prestige job queue will intensify. Such self-serving institutional responses will probably constitute a disabling pattern in that they will undermine the very public confidence that sustains the institutions in the first place.

It could be argued that the problems of today's youth are an inevitable consequence of the relative size of their birth cohorts. Because small birth cohorts result in a relative scarcity of workers, the members of such cohorts possess economic advantages in terms of jobs and income mobility. Because, in turn, they become more prosperous parents, they are likely to have higher fertility. The reverse situation occurs for people born in periods of high fertility, and so the cyclical process continues. There is considerable cross-national statistical evidence demonstrating a strong relationship between the relative size of a birth cohort and the fertility of the cohort.

Bear in mind, however, that the association between birth cohort size and economic advantage operates over and above other important considerations — education, expectations, abortion laws, religious membership, and birth control technology. Thus, given the knowledge about and availability of effective birth control devices, and the concomitant liberalization of abortion laws in Western nations, it is unlikely that completed cohort fertility rates for future cohorts of women will reach those of the post-World War II cohort. Similarly, the increasing labour force participation of married women is likely to inhibit rather than enhance fertility.

Economic effects

Some analysts of the world's economic situation believe that Western societies are moving steadily toward both a state of zero population growth and zero economic growth. Their arguments, though grounded in inadequate facts, since the necessary data is not gathered by Unesco or others, are based on the neo-Malthusian notion that Western nations cannot sustain their high levels of economic growth indefinitely, and that such growth ought to be regarded as the exception rather than the rule. Several determining factors are identified. First, mechanisms such as large-scale wars or the development of radically new technologies, both of which ensure the massive utilization of capital, have not operated in recent years on a sufficiently large scale. The resultant over-accumulation of capital, which has been accompanied by declines in profit margins, has proven the stimulus for huge capital investment shifts from Western nations to those in Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea), South Africa, and South America (Venezuela, Mexico), where political conditions ensure an abundant, non-unionized, low cost, and largely literate labour force—hence, high profit margins. Despite some recent movement of

capital investment back to the developed world, this has been offset by the increasing cost of "free" resources such as air and water, and the virtual exhaustion of cheap mineral and energy resources.

These arguments are imperfect, but even a temporary slowdown in Western economies could be accompanied by changes in the character of Western society. If the slowdown should prove relatively enduring, the consequences for education could be profound. This is because the economic growth assumption is an essential source of individual motivation and social cohesion. For example, the authenticity of Western educational systems is based on the notion that schooling is the key to intergenerational mobility and social equality. But for schooling to be "the great equalizer . . . the balance wheel of the social machinery," economic growth must be sustained. If it is, then job opportunities will expand commensurately; and if job opportunities expand the empirical evidence will support the prevailing educational ideology; namely, success in school will be replicated on the labour market.

What if the prophecy fails? Current evidence suggests some four or five consequences.

(i) The unrealistically high expectations of many youth will have to be brought into line with economic realities, which is easier said than done. Once a society steps on the mobility escalator it is hard to get off. Most strategies to keep youth off an overcrowded labour market can at best be regarded as transitory expedients. Contrivances such as career education or vocational counselling, manpower training and retraining, and proposed work-study programs are incompatible with the Western ethos that reasonable aspirations should not be frustrated.

Witness the emerging problem of recurrent or continuing education. Education for what? Teachers, for example, probably take professional upgrading courses in order to gain salary increments and to qualify for career advancement, and not because they accept the intrinsic-value-of-further-education argument. If the division of labour in society becomes more static, *ipso facto* there is less probability of mobility as a reward for intellectual effort. In such a context, why more education?

(ii) By the same token, if the employment opportunities for youth decline, will there be a decline in the incentives for young people to invest in intellectual competencies? The evidence is ambiguous, but there is growing support for the view that test scores are declining not only because the population of test-takers has changed, but also because the life chances of young people are less hopeful and less promising than in the recent past.

(iii) Worsening job prospects will probably deter youth from making educa-

tional investments which may turn out to be negligible; hence, expect declining university enrolments, and especially from those youth who would be the first generation college-going students in their families.

(iv) As the rationale for the view that schools are society's mobility mechanisms loses ground in the face of conflicting empirical evidence, educational ideology will change. Commencement speakers, editorial writers, and others can be expected to try to "sell" education as an important status achievement in its own right. A human rights approach may find favour; namely, it is everyone's right to become an educated person.

(v) In the face of changing economic realities the "social returns" rationale for an education may be questioned. Subtle shifts in human capital theory may take place, emphasizing the less tangible and more personal rewards of schooling such as enhanced psychological satisfactions; greater self-awareness and self-worth; greater opportunities for realizing valued lifestyles, for controlling one's own affairs, and for participating in community affairs.

Interaction effects

The simple model depicting the changing relationships between school and society may be elaborated by functionally respecifying the relationships, to incorporate interaction or multiplier effects. Over and above the cumulative effects of declining enrolments and declining economic growth, which has been shown to have constraining effects on schooling, it is possible that there is the additional effect due to their interaction. Thus, the effect of declining birth rates on education may have different meanings for societies with different levels of economic growth. The effects may be more radical in their impact in countries such as England or Italy, with their modest growth rates, than in Canada or the United States where growth rates have been consistently higher.

The clue to the impact of social change on infrastructural institutions such as education may be in the magnitude of the interaction between primary change agents. At the macro-level of analysis, interaction effects are seldom formally examined. Such scholarship, however, goes well beyond the scope and intent of this essay. Consider, nevertheless, the following three interaction effects between demographic and economic variables on public education, in societies where real economic growth is approximating zero.

(i) The impact of declining enrolments will result in education developing into a declining rather than a growth industry — especially in the non-compulsory sector. Such change will necessitate drastic changes in management — a confrontation style may emerge during the disequilibrium phase.

(ii) The resultant conflict between vested interest groups in education, ex-

emplified by a mid-career promotion squeeze, will be accompanied not only by declining morale in the teaching profession, but also by a shifting ideological emphasis. There may be a polarization of ideas resulting in the emergence of a new political consciousness — especially on the part of youth.

(iii) Continued deterioration in market conditions in interaction with declining enrolments will eventually affect some tenured educators. Teacher redundancies will cause some distress and despondency. Consider the effects of an aging teacher force. Older teachers may be less innovative, less adaptive, a little slower than young teachers. Schooling could become stultifying. Consider, too, the effects of not replacing retiring academics or researchers or of not recruiting a generation of intellectuals. Nations might inadvertently enter a period of inexorable intellectual decline. As the West matures, intellectual leadership in the sciences, especially in the technological fields, may be lost. Already there is evidence that after three decades of unprecedented growth Western science is operating on momentum. The impact of the interaction between declining birth rates and economic slowdown could already have undermined the infrastructural role of public education as a decisive element in the development of Western science.

Some implications for teacher education

The first act of the teacher education drama is over; it was characterized by explosive enrolments and school system growth. Schools became larger, the number of school districts declined, but the size of school districts increased. Increased size, and greater complexity, caused a rising demand for administrators to coordinate the system operations at all levels — the school, the district, the province or nation. The technocrats became firmly entrenched; empire building and bureaucratic power struggles were not uncommon.

The second act of the drama is underway. It is taking place against a backdrop of events which constitute legacies of the recent past.

(i) Baby-boom girls are so far proving reluctant to become mothers. Now that the leading edge of these girl babies are in their early thirties — hence, have completed their reproductive cycle (since Canadian women over thirty do not have babies any more) — we have realized that there is not going to be a mini-boom. Few new teachers are needed, since the number of teacher withdrawals each year can be replaced with ease in most urban centres by the number of re-entrants to the profession. Thus, there seems little immediate urgency for maintaining an elaborate teacher-education superstructure.

(ii) There is a diffuse political malaise, which has reached acute proportions

in Canada. The malaise is captured in the erosion of strong party government and an absence of effective political leadership. There is less awareness among Canadians that the political fabric of most other Western nations is as fragile. Very few political parties hold comfortable working majorities in the legislatures of Western nations. In countries such as the United States where a working majority exists, the crisis is indicated by the number of voters withholding their vote in protest or in apathy — some forty per cent of the electorate in the last Presidential election. Instances of overt public contempt for politics and politicians are not unknown.

(iii) Though political rights were achieved earlier this century, and though the achievement of civil rights for minority groups is well established, the revolution in rising expectations in terms of social rights continues unabated — not only for free education, health care, and social welfare, but also for the right to work, the right to guaranteed life-long employment, the right to minimum living standards through minimum family incomes, and the like.

But the revolution of rising expectations has given rise to a new character in the drama of Falstaffian proportions — the public household sector of the economy. As the tertiary sector of the economy has grown, the public household sector has emerged as its delivery system. Because of the sustained economic progress since World War II the means of paying for public household services without resorting to income reallocation or significant tax reform has been self-generating. We note, too, that the chief culprit accounting for government growth has been educational growth.

It would seem logical to assume that if growth in school enrolments leads to increased educational costs, then declining enrolments would lead to a reduction in costs. The fact is, however, that expenditures are still rising. Government expenditures are proving inflexible. The problem is magnified by the persistence of wage inflation, largely due to the disproportionate differences in the productivity levels of the market sector of the economy on the one hand and the public household sector on the other.

Given that teacher educators have their backs to the wall, what can be done? At a time when a moratorium on public household growth and expenditure makes sound economic sense, the temptation to trim marginal subsegments of the public household must be almost irresistible. In order to meet new expectations in social entitlements it could prove necessary to trim less viable old entitlements. Such catch-as-catch-can games are much more likely during the period of office of weak governments, and teacher education institutions are prime targets.

Table 1

IMPENDING POPULATION CHANGES IN CANADA SIXTY YEARS: 1971 TO 2031

	Year	Category	DISTRIBUTION BY AGE GROUPS			
			Projection 1			
			0-17	18-64	65 & Over	All Ages
ACTUAL	1971	Number	7,700,000	12,121,000	1,747,000	21,568,000
		Percentage	35.7	56.2	8.1	100.0
	1976	Number	7,266,000	13,750,000	1,977,000	22,993,000
		Percentage	31.6	59.8	8.6	100.0
PROJECTED	1981	Number	6,754,000	15,281,000	2,265,000	24,300,000
		Percentage	27.8	62.9	9.3	100.0
	1986	Number	6,462,000	16,563,000	2,557,000	25,581,000
		Percentage	25.3	64.7	10.0	100.0
	1991	Number	6,366,000	17,398,000	2,910,000	26,673,000
		Percentage	23.9	65.2	10.9	100.0
	1996	Number	6,204,000	18,174,000	3,175,000	27,553,000
		Percentage	22.5	66.0	11.5	100.0
	2001	Number	5,911,000	18,982,000	3,358,000	28,251,000
		Percentage	20.9	67.2	11.9	100.0
	2011	Number	5,473,000	19,813,000	3,882,000	29,168,000
		Percentage	18.8	67.9	13.3	100.0
	2021	Number	5,162,000	19,045,000	5,180,000	29,387,000
		Percentage	17.6	64.8	17.6	100.0
	2031	Number	4,838,000	17,595,000	6,406,000	28,839,000
		Percentage	16.8	61.0	22.2	100.0
			Projection 2			
			0-17	18-64	65 & Over	All Ages
ACTUAL	1971	Number	7,700,000	12,121,000	1,747,000	21,568,000
		Percentage	35.7	56.2	8.1	100.0
	1976	Number	7,266,000	13,750,000	1,977,000	22,993,000
		Percentage	31.6	59.8	8.6	100.0
PROJECTED	1981	Number	6,862,000	15,281,000	2,265,000	24,408,000
		Percentage	28.1	62.6	9.3	100.0
	1986	Number	6,882,000	16,563,000	2,557,000	26,001,000
		Percentage	26.5	63.7	9.8	100.0
	1991	Number	7,156,000	17,398,000	2,910,000	27,463,000
		Percentage	26.1	63.4	10.6	100.0
	1996	Number	7,324,000	18,193,000	3,175,000	28,693,000
		Percentage	25.5	63.4	11.1	100.0
	2001	Number	7,209,000	19,190,000	3,358,000	29,758,000
		Percentage	24.2	64.5	11.3	100.0
	2011	Number	7,028,000	20,733,000	3,882,000	31,642,000
		Percentage	22.2	65.5	12.3	100.0
	2021	Number	7,150,000	20,691,000	5,180,000	33,021,000
		Percentage	21.7	62.7	15.7	100.0
	2031	Number	7,082,000	20,239,000	6,406,000	33,727,000
		Percentage	21.0	60.0	19.0	100.0

Assumptions:

1) Net International Migration: 100,000 persons
2) Fertility Rate: a) Projection 1: Total Fertility rate to decline from 1.84 in 1975 to 1.50 in 1985 and then remains constant.
   b) Projection 2: Total Fertility rate constant at 1.84. (This is admitted to be much too high, some substantial decrease in fertility occurred in 1976 and 1977).

Reference: Social Security (National Programs), 1978. Statistics Canada, Institutional and Public Finance Statistics Branch, Social Security Unit, March 1978. Catalogue 86-201 Annual.

Act Three, Part One. *Scene: a rise in Entitlements*

Before capitulation it might be prudent to try to gain a glimpse of the future. Canada's shifting dependency ratios provide a useful starting point to the third act. By dependency ratio we are referring to the ratio of the population of working age to the non-working age population. The raw data on which approximations of these ratios can be calculated was provided by Statistics Canada, 1978 (Table 1).

It has been noted that rising entitlements are something that governments are going to have to contend with in the immediate future. We have noted, too, that the costs of the currently established rights are considerable and that they are proving inflexible. In order to meet these current entitlements a ratio of about three workers to every two dependents is necessary.

In this regard it is salutory to note that Canada's population is a young one. There are almost four children (actually 3.7) under the age of eighteen for every person over sixty-five. In 1971 the ratio was 4.4 to 1.0. Thus, as the population gets older the ratio of workers to dependents increases such that for the rest of this century there will be more workers per dependent than at any time in Canadian history. These apparently favourable figures, however, hide several trends which are of crucial importance to future societal well-being, and which have profound implications for teacher education.

(i) By the year 2031 there will be more elderly people than children. There will be four persons over sixty-five for every three under eighteen. The reversal will occur sometime between 2020-2021.

(ii) Though dependency ratios will be the same in 2031 as they are today — three workers to two dependents — these are based on the assumption that all men and all *women* aged 18-64 will be fully employed — see Figure 1.

Table 2

FIGURE 1 DEPENDENCY RATIO DATA

Year	(1) Population 18-64	(2) Dependents LT 18 & GT 64	(3) Ratio 1/2
1971	12.121	9.447	1.283
1981	15.281	9.019	1.694
1991	17.398	9.276	1.875
2001	18.982	9.269	2.048
2011	19.813	9.355	2.118
2021	19.049	10.342	1.842
2031	17.595	11.244	1.565

Source: Table 1, Stastistics Canada (1978).

Figure 1

DEPENDENCY RATIOS WHEN DEPENDENCY COSTS FOR YOUNG AND ELDERLY DEPENDENTS ARE ASSUMED TO BE EQUAL



Assumptions: (1) total fertility ratio to decline from 1.84 in 1975 to 1.50 in 1985 and then remain constant; (2) net international migration constant at 100,000 persons.

(iii) It is to be noted that care for the elderly is more costly than care for the young by a factor of two to two-and-a-half. They need and demand more services, live in their own households, and reject the less costly group treatments, and retirement homes are much more costly in aggregate than primary schools. If we weigh the elderly in tomorrow's population by a factor of two we can calculate "dependency unit" ratios as depicted in Figure 2. By the year 2031 it will be noted that there will be exactly one worker for every dependency unit.

Figure 2

DEPENDENCY RATIOS WHEN DEPENDENCY COSTS FOR THE ELDERLY ARE ASSUMED TO BE TWICE AS HIGH AS FOR THE YOUNG



Assumptions: (1) Elderly aged 65 and over, Young aged less than 18; (2) total fertility ratio to decline from 1.84 in 1975 to 1.50 in 1985 and then remain constant; (3) net international migration constant at 100,000 persons.

Table 3

FIGURE 2 DEPENDENCY RATIO DATA

Year	Population 18-64	Dependents LT 18 & 2(GT64)	Ratio 1/2
1971	12.121	11.194	1.083
1981	15.281	11.284	1.354
1991	17.398	12.186	1.428
2001	18.982	12.627	1.503
2011	19.813	13.237	1.497
2021	19.049	15.522	1.227
2031	17.595	17.650	0.997

Source: Table 1, Statistics Canada (1978).

(iv) There are two false assumptions to consider. The whole system is based on the notion that the economy will continue to grow at the pre-established rates and that current levelling shifts are temporary cyclical aberrations. Second, it is also based on the assumption that pension funds will continue to be actuarially sound. Such funds are based upon a ratio of eight to ten workers per retiree. But within thirty years the worker/retiree ratio will be two to one. Massive tax increases in order to meet pension needs seem inevitable.

Since the earliest years of public education the theory and practice of schooling has supported the proposition that the greater the aptitude of the student for coping with the increasingly complex classroom environments provided by the schools, and the more effective the socializing treatments in these settings, the greater the probability that the individual will receive preferred treatments at later stages in the career cycle. In keeping with this screening function of schooling it followed that high-aptitude students received a disproportionately greater share of the resources available than those defined as less talented. But as children become more scarce, hence, more precious, as the tax burden for maintaining adequate care for the elderly reaches unprecedented proportions, the skills and productive efforts of workers will assume greater importance. Talent loss will become unacceptable for either sex.

Similarly, the screening and certification function of schooling may atrophy along with the norm-referenced testing programs which bolster these functions. Today's report card may stand as firm evidence of a repressive and wasteful era in public education, because a changing educational ideology will demand that the preferred treatments and "extra" resources go to those who need them the most rather than those who need them the least. Such resources will be spent on socialization without humiliation.

Because the well-being of a huge elderly cohort in tomorrow's society is going to depend as never before in history on the quality of life of the young, renewed effort will have to be made in terms of their physical and psychological care. Emphasis on prevention rather than cure will prevail, because blighted individuals are costly to care for. And blighted individuals cannot make as valuable a contribution to the life of a community as the future circumstances will demand. Thus, physically and mentally handicapping environments will not be tolerated. In school settings, humanistic strategies will replace authoritarian and laissez-faire procedures.

Authoritarianism depends on coercion or the threat of coercion, or the induction of fear; *laissez-faire*ism goes to the other extreme, as manifest in the abdication of control to pupil peer groups. The first results in the building of numerous restrictive rules and lacks empathy; the second provides unlicensed freedom and believes that love and warmth are enough to ensure psychosocial

development. The first undermines intellectual motivation and the ability to express concern and receive friendship; the second produces dependence on peers and promotes conformism and mediocrity that undermines the self-discipline necessary for intellectually creative work.

In contrast, humanistic strategies supply the warmth, the support, the stimulation, and the concern, in a socializing setting structured to provide conditional freedom — an environment conducive to the internalization of norms and standards promotive of self-sustaining performances.

Act Three, Part Two: *a dismal dénouement*

We have argued that a nation's well-being will depend in future on the productivity of workers who will be in short supply. We have claimed that in this context blighted individuals cannot be tolerated; that talent-loss for either sex will be unacceptable; and that the best way to achieve such goals will be through the introduction of humanistic strategies of teaching.

What are the chances of success? This writer does not rate them as being very high. In Act One — the growth era of exploding enrolments— educational institutions grew larger. Greater coordination of more courses, programs, and departments became necessary. Greater economies of scale were called for. New decision-making hierarchies grew tier by tier. Power was increasingly concentrated at the top of the hierarchy. The number of communication channels required for the transaction of educational business increased; so did the number of bottlenecks, through delays in system operation.

Such bureaucratic arrangements are incompatible with the purposes of education. In fact education is allergic to bureaucratic governance. There are those who believe that centralized uniformity promotes impartiality — hence, equity and unity. But such persons are doomed to disappointment. In large schools teachers cannot get to know their pupils — indeed administrators cannot get to know their teachers. The appointment of guidance counsellors is a poor substitute for the personal attention of a respected teacher. But teachers are increasingly being defined as purveyors of knowledge. And under bureaucratic arrangements knowledge itself is increasingly regarded as a collection of units necessary to gain labour market entry in order to mount the ladder of the occupational structure.

Experience tells us that some form of intrinsic motivation on the part of students is necessary if educational institutions are to be successful. Such motivation promotes identity with educational purposes and requires opportunities for students and teachers to discuss their views and make personal contacts. Education is not an activity analogous to the production of manufactured goods. It is a process of interaction between student and teacher which requires a wide margin of indeterminacy if such goals as social maturity and self-

realization are to be attained.

Bureaucratic governance is inimical to humanistic teaching. It assumes that events can be planned and determined in advance; that students must adjust to the institution, not the other way round. It assumes that there is one best way and that contingencies can be preprogrammed. Inevitably tensions between bureaucratic structures and humanistic teaching will arise. The governing imperatives of bureaucracy are order, rationality, efficiency, and rule following. The imperatives of humanistic teaching are none of these, but rather the indeterminate psychosocial needs of the key actors — teachers and students. Both have to have opportunities for developing their self-esteem and to pursue their goals of self-realization. Bureaucratic arrangements, in short, constitute a disabling pattern. The imperatives of tomorrow's education cannot be realized through today's organizational structures.

Though a human relations model of teaching seems a viable alternative to the bureaucratic model, and though the societal changes necessary to promote humanistic teaching seem inevitable in the absence of dramatic reversals in economic and demographic trends, it is most unlikely in the mid-range future that any dismantling of bureaucratic arrangements will occur. For the time being talent loss can be tolerated. The labour market is already overcrowded. Thus, the deinstitutionalization of bureaucratic educational arrangements runs counter to both immediate societal needs and the psychology of bureaucracy.

In the first place, educational leaders who have spent their lives striving to reach the top positions on the bureaucratic career ladder tend to have acquired the optimum mix of commitment and self-righteousness necessary to deter and defer the introduction of deinstitutionalizing mechanisms. In the second place, because a human relations model of teaching would have to be reproduced by teacher education institutions, and because the model is incompatible with the sifting and selection functions of the university, the divorce of teacher education from the competitive university arena would seem desirable. But the mere contemplation of such a step would be unthinkable to the university-located teacher educator, whose aura of prestige through just such an association would be jeopardized.

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