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Running for School Board:

A survey of campaigners on the Island of Montreal

Considering that at least in principle all the vital issues that surround society's management of its own future are at stake, seeking election to a school board ought to be a challenging experience. In spite of a certain worldly consensus to the contrary, Townsend and Craig approach their study in this spirit. We are conducted through the process by which they arrived at the factors in the "potential" of a candidate that determine winning or losing in a school board election, factors which they then tested on candidates in elections in the Montreal area in 1977. Their discovery of factors that worked for English candidates and of others that worked for French leads to the development of a predictive group that also worked for both, and included Religious Group Endorsement, a Provincial Level of Emphasis, and Coping with Opponents' Tactics! The lively interest with which this study was conducted communicates itself to the reader, not least in a summary of the recommendations made by the candidates for the conduct of future elections.

How do candidates behave in school board elections? What factors seem to be critical to winning and losing? What ideas do campaigners have about improving the electoral process?

On the day after school-board elections on June 13, 1977, we mailed a bilingual questionnaire to 220 Quebecers. They had just sought the 100 seats on the Island of Montreal's eight school boards. Our questionnaire was completed by 104 persons, or about 47 per cent of all candidates — a figure quite in line with returns for scientifically acceptable polls. To our satisfaction, our respondents were representative of the total pool of candidates. By and large, our respondents also were generous with their replies, sometimes enclosing examples of their campaign literature along with extensive comments. We sensed that many welcomed our questionnaire as a timely invitation to unburden themselves of experience accumulated in the course of their campaigns.

In accord with scientific canons, we checked for the representativeness of our respondents in light of the known parameters of the total population of candidates. Our criteria for representations included the following:

1. Percentage of male and female candidates (in the population and in our sample);
2. Percentage of those winning and losing (in population and sample);
3. Percentage of candidates primarily of French or of English orientation (in population and sample).

We assumed the respondents' primary orientation from their linguistic choice of questionnaire: thus those who filled out the French side of our document were assumed to be French. We assumed the primary orientation of candidates in the total population by talking with knowledgeable educators in the eight boards.

Inspection of the above data disclosed that the discrepancy between the total candidate population and our sample did not exceed three per cent; this too is a scientifically respectable difference. Further contributing to the representativeness of our sample was our respondents' tendency toward middle-age and toward having their own children in school. These demographic considerations generally are thought to be associated with members of school boards.

However, we must emphasize that our study has limitations. As with any research dependent on questionnaires, some respondents may have misunderstood our queries. Some may not have answered accurately. Further, we see drawbacks now to our instrument: we wish, for instance, that we had asked candidates to take the time to rank-order certain listings — too often we merely asked them to check-off categories. Again, the Montreal circumstances were quite unusual in at least two regards:

- 1) a number of candidates allegedly were supported by members in riding associations of two political parties, the Parti Quebecois and the Liberals,¹ and
- 2) about 20 candidates advocated the objective of the PQ (and of others) that Catholic and Protestant school boards be unified under one non-denominational aegis. This advocacy was attacked, sometimes vehemently, by the Mouvement Scolaire Confessionnel; it urged the public to vote for other candidates who would continue "truly Catholic administration."²

Nevertheless, despite the involvement of political parties, despite the religious issue erupting in the campaign, and despite methodological concerns, our findings may be suggestive of situations elsewhere.

Electoral dynamics: existing models

There is a folklore about schoolboard campaigning. For example, candidates commonly believe that canvassing a ward

bears an unmistakable resemblance to selling encyclopedias or patent medicines door-to-door. Campaign funding has a lot in common with begging for charity. Discussing the issues means giving the same answers to the same boring questions. Campaign organization is like running a small business always on the brink of collapse, but you cannot easily fire the most inefficient employees, for they are all volunteers dedicated to your cause.³

But what do we know?

Studies exist on the recruitment, ideologies, decision-making, and woes of school trustees.⁴ Yet little scholarly attention has been given to the electoral dynamics of struggles for influence in education. The most elaborate work in this regard has been at the *macro* (community-wide) level. By now, a general connection is acknowledged between changes in community attitudes and the outcomes of board elections.⁵ Iannaccone and Lutz helpfully have refined that notion by hypothesizing that board incumbents will be defeated abruptly when numerous newcomers to a community differ in social-economic status and value preferences from the prevailing narrow interests.⁶ Recent research, however, has not always verified that exact connection.⁷


Nor have verification studies been mounted by social scientists at the *micro* (individual) level. There, candidates have occasionally set down maxims for winning based on their own first-hand experience. Organize early. Get people committed as endorsers and workers. Knock on doors. Don't be forced into a defensive position if you're an incumbent.⁸ However instructive these prescriptions may be — and there is an activism to these maxims that we respect — this advice is so general that it can apply to almost any election; these suggestions for doing well in one particular ward do not particularly reflect the special flavor of school-board contests. The maxims, typically derived from one person's thoughtful reflections, also lack the breadth that might be expected from a wide range of candidates.

For our work, we were attracted instead to a study by Levine, Cuttita, and Clawar: it had both macro and micro elements.⁹ The macro dimension was borrowed from a Lutz-Iannaccone framework of power situations for education,¹⁰ one different in particulars from their theory cited above. This second Lutz-Iannaccone framework links five assets of subsystems to the potential of those subsystems (Figure 1). As in other open-systems models where one thing triggers other things, that potential is seen as having impact on groups inside *and* outside of education. The behaviour of these groups then meshes with the thrust of individuals' interpersonal behaviours. Ultimately, these forces pro-

vide inputs to the school board as a decision-making body. A subsystem within that board can function compatibly with other systems, or it can serve as the dominating centralized power, or it can become so weighty and progressively specialized that it acts quite apart from other subsystems. In essence, what Levine and Cuttitta did in their recent study was to appreciate the “big picture” and sense of process of the Lutz-Iannaccone schema — while choosing to operationalize only a portion of its lower-left quadrant (its micro dimension).

Figure 1

MACRO VIEW OF COMMUNITY DYNAMICS



Assets of a subsystem

(Adapted from the Lutz-Iannaccone Tri-system Model)

Their researchable power situation was the set of elections in 1975 for community school boards in New York City. The 800 candidates and their volunteers were viewed as subsystems. “Potential” referred to the candidate’s assets for achieving his objectives. The candidate’s winnings and losings were correlated with his assets, which were operationalizations of five Lutz-Iannaccone assets. The researchers began with *Intelligence*, “the basic power of understanding and mental activity available to the subsystem,” which included the candidate’s level of formal education as well as any previous appearance on the ballot for government or party office. *Wealth* was defined as referring to the candidate’s out-of-pocket expenses, besides the contributions that he or she mustered from friends and strangers. *Energy* alluded to the candidate’s capacities to work on his own behalf and to enlist volunteers to distribute literature, to mail out brochures, and so forth. *Facilities* denoted the use of tools such as phones and office space as well as the securing of volunteers — a rather mixed assortment of physical and human resources, we thought. *Time* was the investment of hours that candidates and volunteers put into campaigning. Finally, Levine and Cuttitta invented a new category: *Size* meant affiliations with possible backers — through membership, officership, or endorsement in various organizations.

Almost thirty per cent of the New York candidates completed the Levine-Cuttitta questionnaire, received in the weeks following those elections. Through regression analysis, the investigation yielded these findings:

What does seem relevant to predicting candidates' success is

- member in religious organizations (size);
- previous presence on a ballot in a New York City school board election (intelligence):
- distribution of literature by a slate (facilities);
- securing of sound equipment (facilities).

Factors for success or failure

Intrigued by the New York data, we devised a questionnaire for a Canadian sample. In doing so, we accepted the "big picture" and sequencing of the Lutz-Iannaccone model. We also accepted Levine and Cuttitta's over-arching premise that a candidate has a global "potential," comprised of factors and variables of those factors. Stated another way, factors are individual assets such as *Time* that a candidate has or uses to reach his potential, and variables of a factor are the components of each factor. Thus, investing no time in the campaign is a variable of the factor of *Time*.


Yet we were not altogether comfortable with the categories in the New York study. In part, we wanted to be a bit less abstract and more immediately accessible. So we reduced *Wealth* to *Money* and split the *Size* category into *Group Membership* and *Group Endorsement*. We abandoned Levine's notion of *Group Officership* — it had not been significant in the New York study, and intuitively we did not believe it was critical in Quebec. We retained the factor of *Time* and reformulated *Intelligence* as *Previous Experience*; unlike our predecessors, we did not inquire into the candidate's levels of education, on the grounds that this query might make difficult our approaches to respondents (we may have been unduly sensitive on that point). As a separate factor (asset) we judged whether a candidate had run on a *Slate* or as an *Independent*, a consideration that Levine and Cuttitta had placed under *Facilities*. Our *Campaign Techniques* factor included other aspects from this *Facilities* grouping that we had discarded; the variables of *Campaign Techniques*, for instance, subsumed *Use of Media*, *Use of Sound Equipment on Cars*, *Kaffee Klatches*, *Phoning of Voters Before and On Election Day*, and so forth.¹¹

Believing that we acted in the spirit of both the Lutz-Iannaccone framework and the Levine-Cuttitta application, we also posed questions that would uncover still other elements of a candidate's potential. We were curious, for example, as to whether having a *Campaign Manager* was associated significantly with winning and losing. Did it make a difference, moreover, whether the candidate's *Sources of Information* about schools were door-to-door canvassing of people, or talking with parents on the advisory school committees, or conversing with professional educators in schools, or reading the press? Did losing candidates, more than winners, have to cope during campaigns with more *Unexpected Events*, such as family crises or delays in work from their printers? In their roles as advocates of educational policies, most

candidates (we assumed) would speak to the concerns of the voters that would elect them — but did winners also define issues more broadly? Put differently, was it significant if a campaign's *Level of Emphasis* was board-wide, regional, provincial, or even federal? We wondered too whether winners had other *Voters as Targets* than losers did. If candidates believed their *Media Coverage* was inadequate, were they likely at the polls to be losers? And if candidates perceived they had enough money to get their message across, were they likely to be winners? Thus, *Perceived Shortage of Campaign Funds* became a variable of our *Money* factor.

Figure II

A MODEL OF ELECTORAL DYNAMICS



Factors of Candidate's Potential

Figure II shows the potential of a candidate as a function of 13 factors (and of some 100 variables of those factors); these were our independent variables, that had led voters to support or not support a candidate. Then for evaluating with statistics the effectiveness of potential (and its factors and variables), we followed Levine and Cuttitta, and treated candidates' winning and losing as dependent variables.

In order to determine the relative contributions of our factors and variables to election outcomes, a number of statistical procedures were followed.¹² The questionnaire data were computer-coded and frequencies were calculated so as to identify demographic information (such as age, size and occupation), to ascertain relationships between candidates' responses on individual questions to each other and to the outcomes, and to assist in analysis of the accuracy of the data transferred from questionnaire to computer. For each variable, a cross-tabulation procedure was performed to determine the difference between the losers and the winners. We hypothesized (null) that all cells in the cross-tabulation were independent and that no relationship existed between the different variables and election outcomes. A chi square test of significance was completed to test this hypothesis. A significance criterion of $P \leq .05$ was used to establish that the variables were not completely independent and that a relationship seemed to exist between winning and losing and those variables. Then to find

the relative contribution of each variable to election outcomes, a multiple regression procedure was followed, as employed by Levine, Cuttitta and Clawar.¹³ The results indicated some distinctions between the variables. But because of the dichotomy between our dependent variables, we decided that a discriminant analysis procedure would be more accurate in obtaining predictors for winning and losing.¹⁴

Differences between winners and losers

By no means did we think that Canada's so-called "founding races" necessarily were "two solitudes," and indeed we very much regretted the bad feelings which had emerged between certain candidates representing different linguistic communities. We assumed nevertheless that differences between the ethnic groups would be pronounced enough to produce dissimilar findings in French and English samples. That assumption proved correct.

Of the 13 factors of potential in our model of electoral dynamics, only variables relevant to the factors of *Money* and *Campaign Techniques* were found to be significantly associated ($P \leq .005$) with winning and losing among the English candidates. The variable of *Provincial Emphasis* was considered to be approaching the significant level ($P \leq .08$).¹⁵ None of the other variables was found to be significantly associated with winning or losing by English campaigners.

As Table II indicates for our French sample, only variables relevant to *Group Endorsement* and *Group Membership* were found to be more than randomly related ($P \leq .05$) with the campaigning activities of winners or losers. Approaching the significant level was a variable of *Unexpected Events* ($P \leq .08$). In explanation, according to a number of our respondents their opponents had done something which the respondents needed to counter: their opponents had used posters, had gone from door to door introducing themselves, had put leaflets on cars in church parking lots, had hired newsboys to deliver brochures; and so "we did the same immediately." Another candidate observed that his opponent had manoeuvred him into giving unprepared talks, "and my opponent was always prepared." Reflecting the contentiousness of the campaign's religious issue, several campaigners complained that they had not expected to be tagged as "maudits péquistes" or to have their position on denominationalism grossly misrepresented by their opponents; with some fervour, those respondents said that they had been put on the defensive.)

Variables of *Money* and *Campaign Techniques*, which had been significant with English candidates, turned out to be not associated in an orderly way with voter support or non-support for the French candidates.

We next analyzed the total sample of 97 contending candidates (36 English and 61 French), excluding as before those who had won by acclamation. In this blend, statistical significance was found for *Money*, *Campaign Techniques*, *Group Endorsement*, and *Unexpected Events*. Table III also shows that *Level of Emphasis* approached the significant level ($P \leq .08$).

Table I

POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH WINNING AND LOSING

Perceived Shortage of Funds
(Variable of *Money*)Use of Media
(Variable of *Campaign Techniques*)Provincial Emphasis
(Variable of *Level of Emphasis*)

		English Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		18	5	63.9
Yes		3	10	36.1

Significance: $p \leq .004$

		English Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		9	14	63.9
Yes		12	1	36.1

Significance: $p \leq .005$

		English Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		8	11	52.8
Yes		13	4	47.2

Significance: $p \leq .08$

Table II

POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH WINNING AND LOSING

Endorsement of Religious Group

Membership in Religious Group

Coping With Opponent's Tactics
(Variable of *Unexpected Events*)

		French Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		9	38	77
Yes		10	4	23

Significance; $p = .001$

		French Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		9	32	67.2
Yes		10	10	32.2

Significance: $p = .05$

		French Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		18	30	78.7
Yes		1	12	21.3

Significance: $p = .08$

Table III

POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH WINNING AND LOSING

Perceived Shortage of Campaign Funds

		French and English Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		33	32	67.0
Yes		7	25	33.0

Significance $p: \leq .01$

Use of Media
(Variables of Campaign Techniques)

		French and English Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		20	42	63.9
Yes		20	15	36.1


Significance: $p \leq .02$

Coping With Opponent's Tactics

		French and English Candidates		
		WON	LOST	%
No		36	40	73.4
Yes		4	17	21.6

Significance: $p \leq .03$

Figure III
MODEL FOR PREDICTING WINNERS AND LOSERS



We had surmised that *Sources of Information* might turn out to be significant, but it was not — not with this combined sample, nor with either ethnic sample alone. Most frequently, candidates simply consulted parents on school committees for their data, secondarily talking with teachers and principals. We also had suspected that *Voter as Target* might be critical, but here again winners and losers both chose to aim their messages primarily at parents of school-age children. Only a handful visualized their constituencies as also including older tax-payers, youth, low-income groups, or minority groups; their winnings and losings were not statistically significant. We also thought *Campaign Managers* might make a difference, and indeed a number of respondents did write that they “treasured” these managers, especially when managers had community followings of their own. But this facet of potential did not prove to be significantly associated either with winning or losing. Then too, about one-quarter of our candidates ran on a *Slate* with others from different wards, but this factor did not associate with either winners or losers. Surprisingly, incumbency was not as significant as some of our other variables; although we attribute some importance to it, incumbency only approached significance ($P \leq .097$).

As in the New York study, *Time* was not statistically significant. Nearly 30% of the candidates allocated between one and four hours per day over the contest's ten official days, another 30% devoted between five and eight hours daily, and over 13% committed themselves to above thirteen hours per day. Even if these reports may be somewhat exaggerated, they would seem to challenge those who may assert that candidates largely “play it cool,” merely going through the motions of electioneering in the belief that voters make up their minds early in the campaign. Evidently some candidates *do* invest their time as if their electoral efforts might make a critical difference.

Predicting success or failure

Our next step was to take our significant and near-significant variables and attempt to develop a model that would be effective in generally predicting winning and losing. After a series of discriminant analysis procedures with different combinations of variables, we found the items represented in Figure III to be our most effective predictors.

That is, those five variables enabled us to correctly classify winning and losing candidates from the English sample with 77.8 per cent accuracy (specifically, 76.2 per cent of the winners and 80 per cent of the losers). Using the same variables for the French sample, we could weigh the candidate's potential and correctly classify 80.33 per cent of the winners and losers (specifically, 78.9 per cent of the winning candidates and 81 per cent of the losing candidates). When we next combined the two ethnic samples, we could classify our sample's winning and losing candidates with 76.29 per cent accuracy (specifically, 77.5 per cent of the winners and 75.4 per cent of the losers). It is

interesting that *Use of Media* and *Perceived Shortage of Funds* — not significant in the French sample but significant for the English — became good predictors for the combined French and English sample. The numerical difference in our French and English samples may account for this, but there may also be strong secondary characteristics in the French sample which, when combined with other variables, become more expressive.

Campaigners' ideas on improving the process

Wanting to tap the respondents' very human frustrations and constructive suggestions on the campaign they had just waged, we posed a number of questions which called for reaction to events. Ninety-one per cent went on to advocate some reforms.

Overall, in the view of some, the campaign was time-consuming and exhausting. Some found the results surprising. Since reasonable men may differ, the votes were perceived by some as democratic expressions of the electorate and by some as undemocratic. The most common chagrin over the election, however, was the apathetic public — only 21 per cent of the eligible electorate voted, down some 2 per cent from the previous election in 1974. In some districts, the proportion voting was higher. Many suggested that turnouts might be higher if employers were encouraged by government to let their workers off for two or three hours to vote, as in federal and provincial elections. Balloting on Sunday might also bring in more voters, some said.

Candidates turned out to be almost equally divided on the Meet-the-Candidates Nights they participated in. One bloc of respondents was most positive, discerning that the meetings were important and beneficial stimuli, sensitizing the candidates to information and to the dissonances of the public, giving candidates chances for oral communication and hand-shaking, and possibly even influencing undecided voters. If the chairman and organizers of such a function were impartial, one candidate observed, these Nights could provide excellent and "meaty" exchanges. A somewhat smaller bloc of campaigners registered negative impressions of these Nights — they were useless, poorly attended, and not likely to make an impact on the voters. At best, they were "symbolic necessities." For some, these occasions were settings for trying to create "bandwagon" effects, by getting out one's supporters to discourage the opposition.

Even less positive attitudes were held toward the press. While about 40 per cent of our sample did consult the newspaper for leads, media coverage struck 59 per cent as biased, misinformed, sensationalistic, and spotty. A few even thought that the community papers gave them no publicity because they had not taken out expensive advertisements in those papers. The press "yawned over issues rather

than exposing platforms and stimulating interests," one disappointed candidate added. "Fortunately, people do not vote as journalists suggest," another candidate remarked, echoing a number on the French side who minimized the importance of the press in this particular election.

Sixty-four per cent of our sample wanted better enumeration and balloting procedures: better lists of eligible voters, clearer guidance for voters, stricter checks on the voters' identities at the polls, smaller voting districts, banning of candidates from polling areas on election day, removal of the citizenship requirements for voters. Ten per cent of the respondents wanted elections in the fall rather than in June; too many voters were on spring holiday, in their view.

Sixty-three per cent of our respondents wanted to lengthen the formal campaign period of ten days by anywhere from two to eight weeks. If the time-span had been longer in 1977, fifty per cent said they would probably have run a better campaign, reaching more voters with the issues. Thirty-five per cent said they personally had organized too late to wage as good a fight as they would have liked.

Thirty per cent said they spent less than \$250.00 in advancing their causes, but others had this magnitude of commitment:

Amount	Percent of Sample
\$250 — 749	41
750 — 999	7
1000 — 1999	14
2000 — 2999	5
Over 3000	1

The person who spent over \$3000 laid out roughly as much as the typical school commissioner in urban Montreal earns annually for service on a board.

Some fifteen per cent thought funding arrangements needed improvement. All candidates might get tax deductions for their expenses, expenses for all candidates might be standardized, figures on financing might be published, subsidies might be provided for needy candidates, registration deposits for candidates might be increased, advertising aid for all candidates might be furnished by the government, and so forth.

A handful of candidates admitted that they entered the race to get experience and to publicize themselves for future campaigns. Another handful also indicated that they had run to help defeat an incumbent. These responses suggest that there may be more to campaigning than winning.

Overview and implications

Within the limits of a three-page set of multiple-choice and open-

ended questions, we wanted first to generate ideas about what assets (factors and variables of factors) were critical to winning and losing in the June 1977 school-board elections on the Island of Montreal. Extending the New York work by Levine, Cuttitta and Clawar, we identified 13 factors (and their variables) of a candidate's potential that might influence the electoral process. We generated a (null) hypothesis that no relationship exists between election outcomes and 100 variables. Our analysis revealed some evidence toward disproving this hypothesis, as key variables of potential were identified. Table IV summarizes French, English, and Combined Sample factor variables which point to possible relationships between potential and winning and losing.

Table IV

RELATIONSHIPS WITH WINNING AND LOSING	
French	Significance
Religious Group Endorsement.....	(p < .001)
Religious Group Membership.....	(p < .05)
Coping With Opponent's Tactics.....	(p < .08)
English	
Use of Media.....	(p < .005)
Perceived Shortage of Funds.....	(p < .004)
Provincial Level of Emphasis.....	(p < .08)
Combined (English and French) Sample	
Use of Media.....	(p < .02)
Perceived Shortage of Funds.....	(p < .01)
Coping With Opponent's Tactics.....	(p < .03)
Religious Group Endorsement.....	(p < .05)
Provincial Level of Emphasis.....	(p < .05)

The idea that membership in religious organizations is relevant to predicting candidate success was confirmed by Levine and Cuttitta, and the 1975 election in New York did not have the deep religious controversy of the Montreal one. We did *not* confirm, however, other significances of that earlier study; previous presence on a school-board ballot, distribution of literature by a slate, and securing of sound equipment were none of them decisive in our Montreal case.

Using discriminant analysis procedures we were able to test the above factor variables as predictors of winning and losing in the Montreal School Board Election. We identified (1) group endorsement (religious), (2) campaign techniques (use of media), (3) money (shortage of funds), (4) unexpected events (coping with opponent's tactics), and (5) level of emphasis (provincial) as our model for predicting success or failure in this election. This model has limitations but is effective

in classifying winners and losers with the following level of accuracy:

- (1) French — 80.33%
- (2) English — 77.78%
- (3) Combined Sample (French and English) — 76.29%

It should be emphasized that we are not claiming that these other handful also indicated that they had run to help defeat an in-variables will “work” on every occasion. The nature of interpersonal behaviour, the power situation, and other elements of the Lutz-Innaccone model may affect outcomes. We can say, though, that we isolated factors (and variables of those factors) which allowed us to predict fairly well the winners and losers in Montreal’s elections in 1977. Conceivably, some of those same variables may be critical again. Candidates who want to win certainly should consider arming themselves with the endorsement of religious groups, with messages for printed media, with enough money (or access to enough money) not to feel deprived as a campaigner, with resources and flexibilities to cope with the tactics of opponents, and with province-wide issues to emphasize. In samples collected for future research we shall have to examine whether these varies seem to be good predictors.

We also wanted in this paper to capture the candidates’ reactions to their just-completed campaigns. As one might expect, disappointments were mixed with personal satisfactions. What was fairly common, though, was distress over an apathetic public. Quebec’s provincial government, and governments elsewhere, may want to consider some of the reforms that our candidates proposed out of their real experiences. It should not be too difficult, for example, for Quebec to lengthen the official campaign periods, to change balloting from Mondays to Sundays, or to make other procedural reforms. Financial reforms are bound to be more controversial, but task forces could look into this subject, especially the money-saving suggestion that school children might bring home information-sheets on each candidate. To be regarded as credible, the press and organizers of Meet-the-Candidates Nights need to be much more sensitive to all candidates.

Curiously, our data do not reveal whether campaigning in itself is pleasurable. In future research, we will want to learn whether candidates eagerly look forward to an election. Are they happily exhausted by it? Is it a drag? Or do they regard campaigning as an upbeat opportunity to be seen by people and to talk with them?

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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For assistance in processing the data, the co-investigators are obliged to Françoise LeBrun and Sophie Bleecker of McGill and to Bruce Howe, Bill Postl, Muriel Fong and Howard Russell of OISE. We were subsidized by the Translation Services Office at McGill and by a small grant from OISE for computer work.

1. While overt party participation in school-board elections may still be unusual, Michael McCaffery argues well for such close involvement in "Politics in the School: A Case for Partisan Boards of Education," *Educational Administration Quarterly* (August 1971), pp. 51-67.
2. The Mouvement enlisted the Archbishop of Montreal, some priests, a spokesman for the Charismatic Revival, and 19 community organizations. Its implication, according to several of the candidates it worked against, was that non-Mouvement candidates were anti-Catholic or atheist — even though its opponents did not necessarily wish to do away with Catholic education. The Mouvement succeeded, with only one of its opponents winning on June 13.
3. Charles W. Anderson, *Statecraft: An Introduction to Political Choice and Judgment* (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons), p. 140.
4. See for instance Peter Cistone, "School Board Member Recruitment: The Case of Ontario," *Journal of Educational Administration* (1973), pp. 42-56; Stephen B. Lawton. "Models, Analysis, and Interpretation of Education Trustee Voting Behaviour," paper presented at the annual convention of Canadian Society for the Study of Education, 1974; David Wiles and Houston Conley, "School Boards: Their Policy-Making Relevance," *Teachers College Record* (February 1974), pp. 309-318; Benjy Levin, Peter Coleman, et al., "Reflections on Past Disillusion," *Interchange*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1975), pp. 23-40.
5. This observation was not particularly accepted, though, as recently as a decade ago. One of the earliest and most absorbing contributions to this understanding appears in Keith Goldhammer and Frank Farmer, *The Jackson County Story: A Case Study* (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1964). Also see K. Goldhammer and Roland Pellegrin, *Jackson County Revisited* (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1968).
6. Lawrence Iannaccone and Frank W. Lutz, *Politics, Power and Policy: The Governing of Local School Districts* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1970).
7. See especially Eugene P. LeDoux and Martin Burlingame, "The Iannaccone and Lutz Model of School Board Change: A Replication in New Mexico," *Educational Administration Quarterly* (Autmun 1973), pp. 48-65, and David R. Eblen, "Local School District Politics: A Reassessment of the Iannaccone and Lutz Model," *Administrator's Notebook*, Vol. XXIV, No. 9.
8. Robert G. Wegmann, "How one determined man, unknown, unloved, and unfunded, won a seat on an important school board," *The American School Board Journal* (April 1974), pp. 44-45; Louise Dyer, "From an incumbent who just lost; it'll take more than kissing hands and shaking babies to get re-elected to your board this year," *The American School Board Journal* (September 1974), pp. 19-24.
9. Jonathan Levine, Fred Cuttitta, and Harry Clawar, "A Study of Candidates' Success or Failure in the 1975 New York City Community School Board Elections Using the Tri-System Model," paper presented at the annual convention of the American Educational Research Association, 1977.
10. This framework, more multi-faceted than appears here, is drawn from the works of Homans, Loomis, and von Bertalanffy. It appears in Lutz and Iannaccone, *Understanding Educational Organizations: A Field Study Approach* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969).

11. Some factors such as *Slate/Independent* of course had only two variables, but others were more elaborate. For instance, we broke *Group Membership* into seven variables — religious organizations, fraternal groups, parents associations, labor unions, professional and business associations, community groups, and other groups (such as sports clubs).
12. For these statistical manipulations, we did not include our seven respondents who were elected by acclamation.
13. Specifically, for instance, comparisons of the standard partial regression weights (i.e., beta weights) allowed the identification of relative variable contributions to predict election outcomes.
14. This discriminant analysis used a linear combination of loose variables to assist in identifying variables that could be used to predict winning and losing candidates. On request the authors will send a breakdown of discriminant analysis statistics: e.g. canonical correlations, Wilk's Lambda.
15. By way of possible explanation for the near-significance of this factor, in June 1977 the Levesque Government was developing Bill 1 (later superceded by Bill 101), decreeing French as the province's official language of instruction; many English Quebecers perceived this as abrogating rights enshrined in the British North American Act. Nowhere near as significant statistically, five English respondents also had a campaign emphasis which was federal. This emphasis too was to be expected among some candidates, since anglophone Quebecers frequently regard Ottawa as a last hope for protecting English education.