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Moral Philosophy and Education: A Review Essay

John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman. *Introduction to Moral Education.* Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1967 & 1969, 463 pp. $1.75; and Nancy F. Sizer and Theodore R. Sizer (eds.). *Moral Education. Five Lectures* by James M. Gustafson, R. S. Peters, Lawrence Kohlberg, Bruno Bettelheim and Kenneth Keniston. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, 136 pp. $5.95.

Something is altogether wrong with our fundamental ideas about moral education. And the fault, I fear, lies with our philosophers of education. It seems only a moment ago, a part of the present that is passing but not yet past, that all of us would have echoed Henry David Aiken's testimony:

> My contention is, then, that both the methods and the results of contemporary analytical ethics are indispensable adjuncts of enlightened moral practice, and that their study is therefore a useful or even a necessary part of any truly human or liberal education. . . . The analytical philosopher . . . makes his contribution partly by providing us with sharper tools and a clearer notion of the search itself, and partly in a more direct way by freeing us from ancient myths and fetishes which have created endless confusion and needless disagreement about matters that are not necessary parts of the tragedy of human existence.[1]

My contention, taking the two recent works above as the case in point, is that the analytic philosophers have failed to fulfill their part of the collaborative effort in which they are joined by psychologists, sociologists, and educational administrators. Compared to their partners, the philosophers have much the more pleasant job: the other fellows have to go out among people, take notes, collect data, give orders, and do other disagreeable things. One shouldn't complain too much merely because the jobs aren't justly allotted; there

hasn't been a truly equitable division of labor since Adam delved and Eve spun. But it is cause for concern when failure by the favored retards the work of the whole. Paraphrasing Aiken, I regard the philosopher's task as two-fold: first, to bring into clear, conscious focus just what we mean by "moral education" in our most serious and concerned discourse on the topic; and, second, to make it perfectly plain just where moral education becomes a necessary part of the tragedy of human existence. In discussing these two books I shall try to show what the philosophers — John Wilson and R. S. Peters respectively — did and did not do to accomplish that double task.

The main theme of *Introduction to Moral Education* is true without a doubt: we have to be clear on what we mean by "moral education" before we can make any progress in empirical research on how best to accomplish it. Thus the book is mainly Wilson's; its strengths and limitations as a whole derive directly from his success and failure in getting at the meaning of "moral education."

Wilson begins with a slow but ultimately devastating attack against any form of behaviorism as the basic point of view from which to define "moral." Morality is concerned with action, not behavior. And action involves motives, intentions, beliefs, character, and will, among other things. If there are those who are not cognizant of the limitations of behaviorism, and that class probably includes a majority of social scientists, they can learn their lesson in Chapters 1 and 2 of this book.

The expression "learn their lesson" is to be understood literally. I suspect that Mr. Wilson is an excellent teacher; in any case his writing contains all the vices of a pedagogue. He tells you several times what he is going to say, then he says it a half-dozen ways, then he tells you what he said, what he might have said but didn't, and so on, as he admits, *ad nauseam.* One shouldn't blame Wilson, however, for it would take a rare artist-philosopher to give perceptible *form* to all the arguments he touches. Wilson is no artist; he is a teacher who keeps coming at you till, one way or another, he makes his point.

One step up the ladder from behaviorism stands the upholder of what Wilson calls first-order norms or principles. To act morally (in the approbative, not merely classificatory sense) *means* to accept the right principles and to adapt one's

conduct to the requirements of these principles. In that case, of course, one not only behaves properly, one also has *reasons* for taking one action rather than another. And the reasons ultimately come down to one's moral principles.

But that won't do either. For surely if it is once granted that morality is a reason-directed enterprise, then reason won't stop even when it encounters what purports to be an ultimate moral principle like, "Do not hurt other people just for the fun of it." First-order norms are always subject to rational scrutiny, hence they cannot be taken as defining what it means to be moral. There are many neat moves available in the literature of contemporary ethics to make that point. Wilson doesn't try to be neat. He seems to believe, and he's likely right, than an awful lot of people hold very deeply to the view that first-order norms do define morality. He addresses that crowd, rather than the philosophers who already know it's wrong and are therefore concerned more with neatness and elegance in reasoning.

So we have to move up to second-order norms, i.e., standards of reasoning which we may apply both to our first-order principles and also to their applications to particular decisions. (Wilson doesn't draw as clear a line between those two sorts of moral reasoning as I should like to see, but he could well retort that that line is a subtlety of no moment to his purpose, and again he might be right.) But it is important that we distinguish the use of "moral" as it applies to judgments, to actions, or to agents, i.e., actual persons; it is also important to make clear which use is primary and which is derivative. Wilson does make the distinctions and he does come down to the view that the judgmental use is the central meaning of "moral." His analysis thus puts him on the other side of the fence from the existentialists and the proponents of the "new morality" (whatever that might mean). Whatever truth there is in the alternative views is captured in the criteria Wilson proposes for moral judgments or, as he puts it, "moral opinions." "(1) They must be autonomous (freely held). (2) They must be rational . . . (3) They must be impartial as between persons . . . (4) They must be prescriptive . . . (5) They must be overriding." (p. 77) These last two, it seems to me, can be compressed into one: a judgment is to count as a moral judgment only if the person making the judgment recognizes that the meaning of his claim is found in the action it commits him to, i.e., its meaning is not merely

descriptive of some objective state of affairs. A person who said "I've reasoned the thing through and I judge that action A is the morally right thing for me to do in this situation, but so what?" would reveal that he doesn't really understand the meaning of the expression "morally right thing to do."

However difficult it is to explicate any of these criteria with philosophical precision, surely Wilson is pointing in the right general direction when he says, in effect: "That's what 'moral' means." From those criteria it is simple enough to show what "moral" means as applied to actions or agents. A person is moral, in the final analysis, who can make reasonable, intelligible moral judgments and has the strength of will and character to act on and for the moral judgments he makes. And an act is moral when it is done as a moral person would do it.

And thus we seem to be close to the end of our quest. Wilson has carried through the program Aiken had advocated earlier. He has brought the great tradition of English-language ethics to bear on the problem of defining morality. We can now pass the task along to the psychologists and educational technicians to tell us what we must do to make youngsters "good at morality," to use an oft-repeated phrase of Wilson's. But to his everlasting credit, Wilson has a plaguing, unsatisfied doubt: Just why would anyone *want* to be good at morality? Football and tennis are more fun. Business management pays better. Oriental art is a more esoteric subject for cocktail chatter. Revolution is more relevant. Religion offers eternal life. So why be good at morality? Wilson backs and fills; he starts an answer and then looks at the demands of his criteria and slops off. He's too honest to pretend he has an answer when he hasn't, but he's not quite honest enough to admit he's stumped. It's worth considering some of the arguments he starts and drops.

One move is to point to the close connection between rationality and morality. The former is, in ways that Wilson makes clear, a necessary condition for the latter. Agreed. And surely anyone who wants anything at all must want to be rational, for only by acting rationally will he have any chance of getting whatever it is that he wants. Agreed again. And being rational does mean making judgments which are objective, "hence reasoning itself implies a kind of embryonic morality." (p. 104) But there is no way for

that embryo to emerge as a live birth. For Wilson, following his philosophical tradition (and especially the work of R. M. Hare) has already made it perfectly clear that his criterion (3) above must be read in its strongest sense: I am judging impartially as between persons if and only if I am counting my interests as exactly equal to the interests of every other person affected by my actions. Why the Hell is it rational to do *that?* Morality implies rationality, but it's nonsense to think you can turn the horseshoe around.

Scattered remarks, particularly in the footnotes (of which there are ten times too many), indicate another Wilson move, one which nearly involves him in a very ancient fallacy. People are praised and blamed according as they are or aren't good at morality. And there are innumerable advantages to being regarded as morally praiseworthy. Which is, as Glaucon saw, a very good prudential argument for being good at *appearing* to be good at morality. Neither Wilson nor Socrates can advance that argument any further.[2]

So "there seems to remain a basic and genuine question about how far one ought (as a matter of social or psychological expediency) to identify with or care about other people: how much feeling one should invest in them." (p. 105) And how does Wilson propose to answer that question?

(i) "It may be that a proper analysis of such notions as 'happiness,' 'satisfaction,' and 'what a man really wants' on one hand, and of certain concepts in the field of mental health (particularly ... 'communication' or 'relating to other people') on the other, would yield a purely conceptual argument for ... being the sort of person who takes pleasure in being genuinely altruistic. Such an argument would show the importance of 'considering other people's interests' in a much stronger sense; but ... modern philosophers have not given ... these concepts the attention they deserve." (p. 106) It *may* be. But I cannot imagine an argument which would be very convincing to Genghis Khan. I want to defeat my enemies and take their wives and daughters for my pleasure![3] Even more significantly, there is real truth in the Kantian notion that the *point* of morality is lost on those who take pleasure in being genuinely altruistic. For such persons, Wilson's criterion (3) would be unnecessary or, better, would follow as a logical corollary from (1) and (2). I cannot conceive a "proper analysis" which could get by that point; significantly, other modern philosophers haven't even attempted it.

(ii) "On the other hand, it may be that the problem also calls for empirical evidence from psychology; . . . certain unalterable facts about the child's world and his up-bringing indicate a close connection between personal happiness and a strong regard for the interests of others . . . I must leave it to the reader to decide just how strong the [empirical] case is; but it does not seem possible to doubt that it is strong enough for the practical purposes of moral education." (p. 107) Here, it seems to me, Wilson's enthusiasm outruns his good sense. Of course, it is possible to doubt precisely the point at issue. The psychological evidence is clear enough to warrant what is already patent to common sense: kids who grow up without learning to have strong regard for the interests of those around them generally grow up to be rotten, miserable adults. But that takes one only a short distance down the long road toward *moral* education. I suppose Mr. R. M. Nixon has strong regard for the interests of his daughters, perhaps (though it doesn't show) for the interests of Mrs. Nixon. But what about the gooks, the slopes, and the slants? Does the fact that he killed and maimed thousands of innocent people each week in the furtherance of his own political interests imply that Mr. Nixon is personally unhappy? Wouldn't we insist on other evidence — Does he stifle a sob reading body counts? Etc.? — before we would know that his immoral acts are hurting him personally? The force of criterion (3) goes far beyond the sort of strong *feeling* of regard parents have for children and vice-versa. The interests of those near and dear to me can rank *morally* no higher than those nameless, faceless figures who are to me only fellow members of the human community. The forces of evolution, which gave us the imperative to love, extended that love only to those we touch. We have to learn that love before we can learn any other, granted. But it does not seem possible to believe that that point is strong enough to answer the practical question of moral education. When the youngster who is growing up to be a mentally healthy adult, who has strong regard for his family and friends, asks: But why should I regard *every* person's interests equally with my own? — no evidence from psychology is going to answer him.

So it won't wash. Wilson and his colleagues have analyzed rather carefully just what traits, dispositions, skills, knowledge, and attitudes one must acquire in order to be good at morality, even given us some abbreviated Greek names for

them as mnemonic aids. I believe that if an adolescent come to Mr. Wilson for coaching in morality — as one might to Mr. Newcombe for coaching in tennis or to Masters and Johnson for coaching in sex — Mr. Wilson would deliver the goods, rather better than, say, Protagoras. But Protagoras was teaching prudential virtue, and there's always a market for that. But I have never heard a student asking to be made morally better. Nor do I find it strange that the public authorities were less than receptive to his idea of an institute for moral education. Perhaps in the dim unconscious which serves Public Authority in lieu of a mind lies an instinctive wisdom. What would happen to Public Authority, The State, the Established Order, *Society Itself,* if all men and women should learn to be free moral agents? Mr. Wilson is a bit disingenuous when he claims that it is "suicidal" for a national state to ignore moral education. In *his* sense of 'moral,' the only sense which has any credence at all in contemporary philosophy, the survival of the national state as *the* basic form of institutional life is antithetical to moral education. It's logically contradictory to be a loyal subject or a citizen and a free *moral* agent at the same time. In short, Morality? Who needs it?

I should comment on the essays by Williams and Sugarman, but I won't. Each of them is interesting in its own right, but they don't add up to much. The book contains a lot of cross-references, as if the authors felt they had to substitute mechanical linkages for the missing organic unity. They would have done better to provide an index and let the reader find his way about on his own.

Now to Mr. Peters who fails less spectacularly because his attempt is more modest. Perhaps the difference between Wilson and Peters may be put this way: Remember Aiken's speaking of "both the methods and results of contemporary analytical ethics"? Well, Wilson used mostly the results. He reminded us of what we mean by morality when we are using that word in our most serious and self-reflective discourse. From that he went on to talk about moral education as making youngsters good at morality. What he forgot is that "education" has a logic of its own. You cannot educate youngsters in X unless you can show that there is some point or purpose in X, and that point or purpose is ordinarily a *self*-regarding point or purpose. But morality gets its real bite on things just when one must judge from an *other*-regarding point of view. One might train, condition, or indoctrinate youngsters to be moral, but can you educate them to be so? Contemporary

analytical ethics shows us what we *mean* by being moral; it deliberately evades the question why we should be moral.[4] But that question has to be faced when we consider what is or could be meant by "moral education."

Peters employs the method of contemporary philosophical analysis rather than the results. His arguments are less easily summarized than Wilson's. He has written on both education and ethics for a long time, and his ideas have changed in quite significant ways over the years. I shall not attempt to review his work as a whole here. I want, instead, to talk about one idea which seems to me the central theme in his essay in the Sizer collection, an essay entitled "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions." I shall try to show that his central idea, although difficult to grasp in the form presented in this book, is both true and profound. Even so, as I shall also try to show, Peter's central point is only a tentative first step in the accomplishment of the philosopher's dual task in furthering the cause of moral education.

Reading "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions" is not an easy assignment. Like most of us, Peters is crotchety; he is also careless about the surface of what he says. Thus in his first paragraph, Peters writes "but a Robinson Crusoe, untutored in a scientific tradition, could not ask a scientific question, let alone exhibit 'creativity'." Now if there were a person named Robinson Crusoe who was untutored in a scientific tradition, what Peters says would most likely be true of him. But the person we know by that name, the central character in Defoe's novel, speaks of "the integrity and honesty of my friend the captain; under whom I also got a competent knowledge of mathematics and the rules of navigation, learned how to keep an account of the ship's course, take an observation ... for as he took delight to instruct me, I took delight to learn." *(Echoes of the Clerk of Oxford)* One is loath to call such a man, especially in 1650, untutored. In fact, many of the adventures of Mr. Crusoe wouldn't make any sense at all if he had been portrayed as an untutored savage. The instance is trivial, of course; I mention it only to illustrate the point that in reading any of Peters' works, one must get beneath the surface to find the gold.

The key to Peters' thesis appears on p. 45; there he concludes an argument with the arresting comment, "all education is, therefore, moral education." That might appear merely another Robinson Crusoe-type statement; surely, we want to

say, Fagin's school was not engaged in moral education. But, in fact, Peters' claim follows from three fundamental lines of argument which go back a long way in his thinking and writing on education. The first two of these arguments seem to me true and important. The third is quite controversial but obviously of central concern to the concept of moral education.

First: There are two concepts of education. The general concept is purely descriptive, the specific concept is a term of approbation, the details of which we may discover by careful analysis. In a general way, we may describe Fagin's activities as educating a gang of pick-pockets. Every society, however primitive, may be said to provide education for its youth. For the purpose of the social scientists, this general concept is the more useful sense of the term. But Peters wishes to insist that "there is a more specific sense of education which emerged in the nineteenth century in which education is distinguished from training and which is used to pick out processes that lead to the development of an 'educated man'." (p. 45) Peters' insistence on this point is well taken, I should think. Our language and thought would be impoverished if we allowed "education" to go the way of "culture." The social scientists' use of the latter term has become so dominant that one cannot speak of an "uncultured person" without standing convicted of baseless snobbery. But not everyone who grows up to be a productive member of society is an educated person—man or woman. Education is merely one way of becoming socialized. It is, indeed, quite dubious that our society could survive if education, in that specific sense, were the mechanism of socialization for everyone.

Second: Among the marks which distinguish an educated person from others is the capacity to distinguish the worthwhile from the worthless and the will to pursue the worthwhile for its own sake. This is not the only criterion for being an educated person; in fact, it is the most difficult criterion to specify with exactness and apply with assurance.[5] But it *is* a criterion: the educated person knows that poetry is more worthwhile than push-pin, and when he reads and writes poetry he does so for the worth inherent in that activity. Again, Peters must be right in principle, however difficult it is to distinguish in particular activities the worthwhile from the worthless.

Third: The moral life consists of the pursuit of worthwhile activities with depth and breadth of understanding. That is my formulation; Peters says, "We are to include the pursuit

of good in morals and not just confine [morals] to codes and more general dealings with other men." But taken in the context of this essay and his other writings, my formulation cannot do serious injustice to his meaning. It is this third premise, of course, that is controversial, and I shall try to give reasons for rejecting it. But the point here is that with these three premises, Peters can assert that all education (in the specific sense of the term "education") *is* moral education. In a free and liberal society, youngsters would be charmed or cajoled (or maybe coerced just a little) into pursuing worthwhile activities until they really got on the inside of them and could perceive the inherent value of those activities for themselves. Each child could eventually discover what particular forms of worthwhile activities fit best with his unique talents and desires; thus each child could grow into the estate of an educated person and a free moral agent. That is the "Concrete Principles" aspect of Peters' argument. To teachers it says, in effect: Take care of education in its highest sense, and morality will take care of itself.

But, of course, that is not the whole story of the moral life. Fiddling is a worthwhile activity. It may be pursued with depth and breadth of understanding. But it's morally wrong to fiddle while Rome burns. Why? What is there about morality which transcends the pursuit of the worthwhile with broad and deep understanding? Now Peters has two different answers which I see as diverging in their essential demands but which he regards as complementary. The first answer is that an educated person has consideration for the interests of others. "In practice the rays of this principle are largely refracted through the prism of our social roles and general duties as members of a society." (p. 41) In virtue of his station as Emperor, it was Nero's duty to do everything he could to retard the fire, or, if nothing of that sort were in his power, to render aid and comfort to its victims. Being socialized, i.e., learning one's station and its duties, is a part, albeit not the whole, of being educated. Good, sound Aristotelian doctrine: sometimes our public duties take precedence over the pursuit of the contemplative virtue, i.e., those activities worthwhile in themselves. The boy who has learned habits of response to public duty is father to the morally virtuous man. So far, all of these points are encompassed in Peters' concrete principles.

But now let us suppose that Nero were merely an itinerant fiddler, that his station imposed no duty to attend to the fire

or those who suffered from it. Should he then leave the safety of his hill and risk his life to help others? Would it be rational to do so? Is there a stray beam of that moral principle which demands that we put our own interests on equal footing with the interests of all others unrefracted by our social roles and general duties as members of a society? We would think that anyone really good at morality would there perceive an obligation transcending the pursuit of worthwhile activities. Peters puts it very convincingly, though in a different context:

> My guess is that people are able to do this only if they are passionately devoted to fairness, freedom, and the pursuit of truth and if they have a genuine respect for others and are intensely concerned if they suffer. As Spinoza put it: "Blessedness is not the reward of right living; it is the right living itself; nor should we rejoice in it because we restrain our desires, but, on the contrary, it is because we rejoice in it that we restrain them." (p. 51)

That is the second, the "Rational Passion," answer to the question of what is wrong with anyone's fiddling while Rome burns. The quotation from Spinoza (which Peters repeats from his now-classic "Paradox of Moral Education") is echoed in Wilson's notion of taking pleasure in being a genuinely altruistic person. And the same argument applies: The man who is truly blessed doesn't need morality at all; he instinctively regards his own interests impartially with those of all others. His moral judgment: What ought I do? is exactly the same as his personal judgment: What do I want to do?

Now these two answers seem to me antithetical. The history of civilization does reveal that, at times, men have succeeded in training a substantial part of their offspring in concrete principles, such that the members of the new generation perform their life's duties even when those duties conflict with personal interest. But never have men succeeded in *educating* their young to a state of blessedness. Virtue in that sense is, as Socrates suggests to Meno, a gift of divine providence.

Thus it is no cause for wonder that the psychologists and sociologists pay little heed to the philosopher's analysis in their attempt to describe how it is that children learn to be moral. Peters' charge to the psychologist is simply impossible to accomplish:

> It is not for the philosopher to pronounce on how children can be got on the inside of this more rational form of life, or on how the rational passions, which personalize fundamental principles, can best be awakened and developed. That is a matter for psychologists. The philosopher's role is only to indicate the sort of job that has to be done. (p. 50)

Why does that sort of job *have* to be done? Would we really want it done? It is instructive to examine the essays by Kohlberg and Bettelheim in the Sizer collection. Kohlberg makes a pitch for a Platonic conception of a vision of The Good as the goal of moral education, but his evidence suggests that very few human beings ever approach that level of moral development. And perhaps that's just as well. He also claims that those who make their own moral choices on a more primitive basis can at least perceive and acknowledge moral claims made from a more sophisticated standpoint. And that also seems reasonable: We ought to be able to expect that our public affairs will be conducted on a higher moral plane than we would care to live as private citizens. Kohlberg's findings support Pericles' defense of democracy.

Bettelheim makes the case that a strong superego is a necessary condition for effective prudential reasoning — which sounds plausible. Perhaps a well-contrived schedule of reinforcement with babies would work as well, but we don't have the technology to do it. But Bettelheim doesn't even consider how one might transcend prudential reasoning to awaken a national passion for the moral life. He simply ignores the sort of job that Peters lays on him. And I think rightly. We cannot educate a child in anything unless he is capable of sustained prudential reasoning. But what in God's name would we do with a student who was a free moral agent? It boggles the mind.[6]

Thus it seems to me that Peters cut the philosophical contribution to the discourse a bit prematurely. What his analysis here and elsewhere shows is that there is a certain *formal* analogy between getting on the inside of morality and getting on the inside of any other worthwhile activity, such as music, mathematics, or metaphysics. And therein lies the trouble with Peters' third premise: He appears to claim that the pursuit of any worthwhile activity is equivalent to the pursuit of moral excellence. And that is simply false, or else it's a very misleading way to express a truism: There's nothing *immoral, eo ipso,* in the pursuit of any worthwhile activity. If this formal analogy is pursued, we ought to be able to see, from a philosophical level, just what sort of dialectical development is necessary to the growth of a truly moral person. The nearest example I know is Socrates' speech in the Symposium, where the Love of the Good is shown as a continuous growth from a primordial desire for beautiful objects. Until that form of

spiritual dialectic has been elucidated, the philosopher has not shown what is meant by "moral education," taking care to give equal emphasis to both words. In short: there's gold left to be mined from Peters' essay.

Now two final comments: If Peters' third premise is wrong and our thoughts about moral education are to be redirected along the lines I've suggested, we must accept the fact that a free moral agent, a man truly good at morality, is as rare as a really good metaphysician (or mathematician or musician). We do not find a dearth of good metaphysicians any great inconvenience. Most of us can rely on our socially conditioned response to guide us in distinguishing reality from illusion when the question arises. And those who, for one reason or another, simply can't make that distinction, we put in mental hospitals. Likewise we ought to be able to rely on the social training we give children, particularly when that training is motivated by love and respect for children as persons, to teach them to distinguish right from wrong and to do the right thing most of the time. In a decent, civil society we can rely on the diminutive etiquette to be a reasonable guide to the majestic ethics.

But, of course, when a society has reached such a stage of disintegration and corruption that cruel immorality becomes prudentially rational and the dominant habit of the powerful, then one must call for revolution. I believe, for reasons I have stated elsewhere,[7] that revolution is necessary in Western Industrial Society, though I haven't any clear idea about how to bring it off. Peters finds such talk odious: Let him then show how it can be brought about that most of us, who do and always will lack that rational passion for morality, may learn that it is personally prudential to reallocate the world's limited resources on a more equitable basis. It's a decent question, I think. There's no need for rancor, Mr. Peters.

Finally, many writers on ethics have asked us to begin our thinking on the subject by asking ourselves how we ought to rear our children. The question is not easy. We would all like to see our children grow up to be adults who are decent and law-abiding while passionately involved in the pursuit of worthwhile activities. But would we want them to pursue moral excellence for its own sake? Would we want them to live a life in which they are intensely concerned for the suffering of all other men — and women and children — now that that suffering is brought into every parlor in living color?

Would we want them to be passionately devoted to fairness, freedom, and the pursuit of truth in a world organized fundamentally on exploitations and lies? We have it on good authority that the moral life is not an easy one; today it seems lonelier, more painful and tragic than ever before. I think I should prefer it if my sons pursued some other worthwhile activity — like analytic philosophy.

notes and references

1. H. D. Aiken, "Moral Philosophy and Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, Winter, 1955. Reprinted in P. G. Smith, ed., *Theories of Value and Problems of Education*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970.
2. In a society like that of the USA which seems to reserve its highest offices and awards for its greatest scoundrels, that ancient argument for morality might not even get started.
3. It's interesting that Wilson here drops a footnote and quotes his own *Logic and Sexual Morality*: "To put it in the least high-minded way I can think of, you *get more out* of people if you identify with them . . . " (emphasis in original). Well, in sexual relations that seems to me quite true. I'm sure that Humbert got more out of Lolita than would a less sensitive man, one possessed of less capacity for identifying with others. And Sir Stephen more out of O. But that's a long way from treating the interests of others as equal to one's own.
4. There are exceptions, of course. See Kurt Baier's "Why Should We Be Moral?" in his *Moral Point of View*, New York: Random House, 1965, Chapter 7.
5. R. S. Peters, *Ethics and Education*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966, Chapter V. See also the discussion of Peters' book in *The Philosophy Forum*, VIII, 1 (Sept. 1964), pp. 81-96.
6. There are interesting and relevant points in other essays of this collection, but no time to discuss them here. The Sizers' "Introduction" misses the point, predictably. And I am suspicious of any book which attempts to justify moral principles without first justifying its margins.
7. "Education and Economic Planning," *Teachers College Record*, Vol. LSS, No. 8 (May, 1969), pp. 777-786.