likely to have the weakest consciences and, therefore, most likely to be delinquents. Studies conducted by Farrington and others have shown that Eysenck's theory has some utility in predicting which individuals will eventually become delinquents.

Finally, Farrington advances his own theory of delinquency which integrates many of the previous theories reviewed in this area. Farrington proposes that “the major factors fostering anti-social tendencies are impulsivity, a poor ability to manipulate abstract concepts, low empathy, a weak conscience, internalized norms and attitudes favouring delinquency, and long-term motivating influences such as the desire for material goods or status with peers” (p. 151). Farrington concludes his argument by stating that short-term situational influences such as boredom, frustration, alcohol consumption, and opportunities to offend are often factors that determine if anti-social tendencies are translated into delinquent acts.

Overall, The School Years: Current Issues in the Socialization of Young People, edited by John C. Coleman, provides a well-rounded overview of some of the major issues concerning adolescent development. Although some chapters present stronger arguments than others, most are engaging and all selections provide a useful summary of the competing theories that have been advanced in the study of the socialization of young people.

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REFERENCE


Whenever psychologists gather to talk about intelligence, Charles Spearman is listening at the door. Spearman (1863-1945) found that many different mental tests correlate with one another, and argued that the factor common to all is general intelligence, or g. There has been much spoken and written about intelligence since Spearman and most of it takes g for granted. In this world view – Sternberg and Wagner call it "g-eocentric" – what people carry around in their heads is g, and g is what enables them to perform academic and related tasks.
Now this view is being challenged. The challenge is coming, on the one hand, from radical contextualists who argue that intelligence is not inside people's heads at all but rather is distributed across the situations with which people engage; abilities are in situations or at least between persons and situations. On the other hand, the challenge is coming from psychologists like the ones represented in the nine chapters of this book. The psychologists are steering a middle course between the Spearman school and the contextualists. They see intelligence as the interaction of mind and context, thus preserving both minds and contexts, while focusing on their relations.

In the empirical chapters (which form roughly half the book), diverse contexts are examined. Stephen Ceci and Antonio Roazzi report research from Brazil that shows effects of social ecology on math performance. Poor children performed better in everyday settings than at school, thus underlining the importance of social and cultural situations. Similarly, Cynthia Berg and Katerina Calderone report that children view different problem-solving strategies as effective, depending on whether the problem occurs in a school or an everyday setting. Berg and Calderone also report developmental differences in how everyday problems, such as breaking a friend’s calculator, are interpreted. Interpersonal interpretations were the most frequent for all ages, and task interpretations became less frequent with age.

Two chapters examine industrial-organizational contexts. In a discussion of cognitive ability testing in job selection, Wagner argues that g is overrated as a predictor of job performance. Estimates improve when other predictors, especially tacit or practical intelligence, are used. Wagner's is one of the strongest chapters of the book, in contrast with Fred Fiedler and Thomas Link's, the most disappointing. Fiedler and Link investigate relationships among leadership, intelligence, and stress, finding that under high stress, intelligence and leadership are more strongly correlated than under low stress. Unfortunately, these authors seem to take their results as ends in themselves rather than as occasions for further reflection and insight.

The remaining chapters present theoretical frameworks and literature reviews. The most challenging is Richard Snow's account of abilities in academic tasks. Snow distinguishes four meanings of interaction — independent, interdependent, reciprocal, and transactive — before developing his own model of person-situation interaction. He opts for a "provisional eclecticism" in which some aspects of persons and situations are definable in isolation, whereas others exist only in union
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with the other. Dense and difficult, Snow’s chapter will reward careful attention from educators.

For a book title Mind in Context, surprisingly little is said here about Vygotsky: It is left to Jaan and Man-Chi Leung to take a sociogenetic approach to intelligence. Aware of the metatheoretical implications of their work, these authors argue for the interdependence of active persons and social worlds in the construction of knowledge. Although relevant and interesting, Valsiner and Leung come across as voices in the wilderness. Less relevant is the chapter by Sternberg and Michael Gardner, a seemingly out-of-place literature review of the relationship between novelty and the measurement of intelligence.

A multiple intelligences approach is presented by Nira Granott and Howard Gardner. Those familiar with Gardner’s work will recognize the distinction between first- and second-order intelligences: First-order intelligences are innate, whereas second-order ones are developed (or disrupted) through interactions with the environment. Granott and Gardner also present a scheme for analyzing individual-environment interactions according to dimensions of relative expertise and degree of collaboration. An equally wide-ranging model is outlined by Sternberg in the final chapter of the book. Sternberg presents a broad framework for understanding people’s ability to interact successfully with their contexts. Sternberg dubs his model PRSVL (pronounced Parsifal) because it addresses person, roles, situations, values, and luck variables in person-context interaction.

This book may be suitable for graduate courses in measurement or cognition, although its very diversity could be a drawback. A more serious limitation is the uneven quality – strong chapters by Snow and Wagner are offset by several that seem out of place. The editors have not attempted any integration beyond Sternberg’s general framework chapter at the end, and the authors don’t seem to be aware of one another’s work. In short, Mind in Context is no Copernican revolution. It does, however, offer glimpses of what a post-g-eocentric universe may look like.

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