The Implications of Postmodernism for Moral Education

Abstract

This article examines postmodernist thought in terms of its implications for moral education. The basic features of postmodernism are described with particular focus on its rejection of the modernist notion of reason. This is followed by a discussion of neopragmatist Richard Rorty’s proposal to replace Enlightenment concepts of objectivity and morality with an emphasis on ethnocentric solidarity as a preferred means of developing social norms. The concluding section argues that this postmodernist approach has the potential to violate the fundamental precepts of democratic living, and therefore may provide an inadequate framework for the theory and practice of moral education.

Résumé

Cet article étudie les répercussions de la pensée post-moderniste sur l’enseignement moral. Les principales caractéristiques du postmodernisme sont décrites sous l’angle du rejet de la notion moderniste de la raison. Il s’ensuit un débat sur la proposition du néopragmatiste Richard Rorty qui vise à remplacer les concepts d’objectivité et de moralité des Lumières par la solidarité éthnocentrique comme moyen privilégié de développement des normes sociales. Dans sa conclusion, l’auteur explique que cette vision post-moderniste risque de violer les préceptes fondamentaux de la vie démocratique et constitue par conséquent un cadre inapproprié à la théorie et à la pratique de l’enseignement moral.
Introduction

As a form of cultural critique, postmodernism began to garner considerable attention during the mid-1970s, and has enjoyed an increasingly popular reputation as an incisive mode of inquiry for a number of disciplines including, among others, the study of philosophy, art, literature, history, sociology, and education. Adding to this broad scope is the fact that the term *postmodernism* is given to several distinct, yet vaguely connected, schools of thought. These include the poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, the contemporary Marxism of Frederick Jameson and Terry Eagleton, the neopragmatism of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Richard Rorty, as well as aspects of feminist scholarship which employ a postmodern critique of patriarchal society. Not surprisingly, this diversity of application and perspective makes postmodernism difficult to define, other than to say in the most general way that “postmodernism refers to a distinct shift in the way that humanistic intellectuals view the relation of their cultural work to the society at large” (McGowan, 1991, p. 1).

In light of this broad scope, a comprehensive analysis of postmodernism and its multitude of potential implications for education in general, and moral education in particular, is beyond the reach of a single essay. My intention here is to examine the basic features of postmodernist thought, placing particular emphasis on the neopragmatist strain articulated by Richard Rorty, and in so doing, pinpoint some basic questions that postmodernist philosophy might raise about the theory and practice of moral education. In the second section of this paper I will suggest that if moral education is to promote a democratic way of life, it is necessary that it encourage students to include basic philosophical principles such as equality and justice in the process of moral deliberation. In conclusion, I will argue that postmodernism’s rejection of principled moral deliberation may constitute justifiable grounds for questioning its legitimacy as a philosophical framework for a moral education that is consistent with the ideals of democratic living.

From Modernity to Postmodernism

Like all movements or trends in the social sciences, the emergence of postmodernism cannot be seen as a self-generating or ahistorical phenomenon. According to Aronowitz and Giroux, “Postmodernism can only be understood in terms of its problematic relationship with the central features of the modernist tradition” (1991, p. 64). In the political sense, this “problematic relationship” reflects a discouraged reaction to modern democratic society’s failure to deliver on its promise of justice, freedom, and equality for a variety of marginalized and exploited groups.
First and foremost, postmodernism is a refutation of the modernist belief that Enlightenment appeals to reason, once rigorously applied, would produce a just society. Employing a line of argumentation similar to that of Nietzsche, postmodernists like Richard Rorty bluntly proclaim that

... the traditional Western metaphysico-epistemological way of firming up our habits simply isn't working anymore. It isn't doing its job. It has become as transparent a device as the postulation of deities who turn out, by a happy coincidence, to have chosen us as their people. (1991, p. 33)

The modernist idea that truth could be found without appeal to external deities or authorities but rather through self-generated principles of objective reason and science is, according to the postmodernist, a ruse. It is a deception, postmodernists claim, partly because the principles of modernity have been largely drawn from cultural scripts written by white males whose work is often privileged as a model of high culture informed by an elite sensibility that sets it off from what is often dismissed as popular or mass culture. (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 58)

In effect, the grand narratives of Western literature and the Platoneto-Kant-canon of philosophy do not lead toward truth, moral virtue, and ultimately freedom, but rather represent a monopolization of meaning which by its very nature excludes and dominates those outside the privileged cultural and intellectual elites. In other words, these literary and philosophical traditions do not in reality offer objectivity or scholarly disinterestedness, but instead constitute "ideological expressions of particular discourses embodying normative interests and legitimating historically specific relations of power" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 68).

Central to postmodern theory is the claim that modernist attempts at objective reasoning in fact operate as a means of creating, maintaining, and legitimizing power. The equation of modernist reason and the legitimation of power relations is evident in the work of many postmodernists. Poststructuralist Michel Foucault (1978) focused on what he refers to as discourses of knowledge-power, which he sees as overwhelmingly potent mechanisms in the regulation of society. Neopragmatist Jean-Francois Lyotard argues that "reason and power are one and the same thing. You may disguise the one with dialectics or prospectiveness, but you will still have the other in all its crudeness: jails, taboos, public weal, selection, and genocide" (cf. McGowan, 1991, pp. 182-183).
The idea of reason being inextricably equated with the workings of power strongly implies that the modernist concept of autonomy, the conviction that individuals and social groupings can define themselves and conduct social relations independent of external determinants or influences, must be rejected. Taking the place of the concept of autonomy is the conviction that human beings are often nothing more than the products of historical contingencies. The more pessimistic postmodernists argue that the notion of an autonomous emancipatory transformation of personal or social life is a delusion. This reason-as-power equation provides postmodernism with its explanatory framework to account for the failure of modernist appeals to objective reason to do anything other than deeply entrench the capitalist racist patriarchy which is Western culture's historical legacy.

The postmodernist political project is to deterritorialize modernism and redraw "its political, social, and cultural boundaries, while simultaneously affirming a politics of racial, gender, and ethnic difference" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 68). For the Marxist wing of postmodernism, modernity has provided the cultural framework through which capitalism has become an all-consuming monolith, the "totalized terrain" of contemporary Western life. From this perspective, "[p]ostmodernism's overt political goal is the disruption of this hierarchical totality, a disruption to be enacted by empowering the suppressed differential components within that totality" (McGowan, 1991, p. 17).

In sum, the postmodernist attack is rooted in the belief that the modernist faith in a transcultural ahistorical reason evoking a transcendent subject, has served only the privileged and worked to deny difference under the guise of universalizing categories. Postmodernism intends to replace the abstract universalizing of modernity by focusing on the historical contingencies that produce certain types of discourse and the plurality of voices which come into contact during these discourses. As Rorty suggests, "The notion that Western reason suppresses differences in constructing identities leads to a compensating emphasis on particulars" (1991, p. 24).

The most immediate problem plaguing the politics of postmodernism is that the "emphasis on particulars", the hoped-for public discourse affirming racial, gender, and ethnic difference, provides only the rationale for insisting on what postmodernists call a "free and open encounter" where a plurality of voices is recognized. This position, however, tells us little about how a free and open encounter will result in anything more adequate than a discourse mediated by abstract reason. As McGowan points out, "There remain considerable difficulties in outlining what a practical politics of heterogeneity would look like, not
to mention how we might begin to put such a politics into practice” (1991, p. 21). Rorty replies to criticism of this kind by stating that in a free and open encounter, truth will prevail.

On this view, to say that truth will win in such an encounter is not to make a metaphysical claim about the connection between human reason and the nature of things. It is merely to say that the best way to find out what to believe is to listen to as many suggestions and arguments as you can. (Rorty, 1991, p. 39)

As I will argue later in this paper, in a discussion of postmodernism’s implications for moral education, a reply of this sort is unsatisfactory.

The postmodernist critique of modernist traditions — in terms of their propensity to monopolize discourse under the guise of objectivity — is, in many ways, compelling. On one hand, it reveals the obvious: that the shaping of Western social, political, and cultural traditions has been the exclusive domain of an extremely narrow, highly privileged group. The deconstructionist techniques of postmodernism, in particular, have provided a provocative means of demonstrating that this privileged group’s stewardship as architects of Western culture has reflected that group’s worldview and worked to promote and maintain its interests. On the other hand, the poststructuralists have, at times ingeniously, illustrated how the often subtle social construction of knowledge, appearing as the natural order of things, has a powerful influence over human affairs. For example, Michel Foucault’s (1978) *History of Sexuality* illustrates how individuals’ personal identities have been created — and subsequently controlled — through the social construction of a particular “sexuality” to which people have become subject. These selected modes of postmodernist inquiry can meaningfully enrich the social sciences and usefully broaden the scope of public discourse.

Despite these accomplishments, the postmodernists, in order to present a coherent, consistent philosophical system, must continually confront the question of objectivity in addressing philosophical issues. In attempting to make an unbreakable and irresolvable equation of Enlightenment reason with the structures of power and domination, the postmodernist intends, in part, to demonstrate that identifying the conclusion of a truly rational subject, in the Enlightenment sense, is an unachievable task. Like other theories which may be broadly characterized as relativistic, at the core of postmodernism is the claim that objectivity is a myth: “Each picture of reality is a product of personal or social factors, and although such pictures can be compared with each other, they cannot be compared with the world itself” (Gottlieb, 1991, p. 30).
What distinguishes much of contemporary postmodernism from other relativistic philosophical perspectives is that while various forms of antifoundationalism stress that what counts as rationality at any given time is not fixed and is open to critical deliberation, postmodernism, when taken to its logical conclusion, attempts to refute the legitimacy of rational deliberation based on Enlightenment concepts such as equality and justice. As a result, postmodernism can be described as resolutely antifoundational, seeking not to deal with the workings of power by developing rational or principled criteria for resolving power differentials, but rather by basing any possibility of emancipation by first insisting that criteria genuinely drawn from abstract reason simply do not exist.

Of the postmodernist scholars, it is American neopragmatist Richard Rorty who has most explicitly fleshed out the question of objectivity. Rorty has become one of contemporary philosophy's most influential and talked-about philosophers (Gottlieb, 1991). Rorty chooses not to oppose objectivity by employing terms such as "subjectivity" or "relativity", but rather seeks to contrast objectivity with a concept of human solidarity. He proposes that this quintessential philosophical debate can be set up in the following way.

There are two principle ways in which reflective human beings try, by placing their lives in a larger context, to give sense to those lives. The first is by telling the story of their contribution to a community. This community may be the actual historical one in which they live, or another actual one, distant in time or place, or a quite imaginary one, consisting perhaps of a dozen heroes and heroines selected from history or fiction or both. The second way is to describe themselves as standing in immediate relation to nonhuman reality. This relation is immediate in the sense that it does not derive from a relation between such a reality and their tribe, or their nation, or their imagined band of comrades. I shall say that stories of the former kind exemplify the desire for solidarity, and that stories of the latter kind exemplify the desire for objectivity. Insofar as a person is seeking solidarity, she does not ask about the relation between the practices of the chosen community and something outside that community. Insofar as she seeks objectivity, she distances herself from actual persons around her not by thinking of herself as a member of some other real or imaginary group, but rather by attaching herself to something which can be described without reference to any particular human beings. (Rorty, 1991, p. 21)
In rejecting the Enlightenment, Rorty believes that as human beings we will be better served if we can become "moved solely by the desire for solidarity, setting aside the desire for objectivity altogether. . ." (1991, p. 27). Rorty, however, does not aim at a transcultural or universal human solidarity, but rather pins his hopes on an ethnocentric sense of community that has no foundation except shared hope and the trust created by such sharing. "To be ethnocentric is to divide the human race into the people to whom one must justify one's beliefs and the others" (Rorty, 1991, p. 30). In the absence of any universal human values, the shared values of one's community provide the sole criteria for discerning truth, and one's community must be granted "a special privilege. . . or we pretend an impossible tolerance for every other group" (Rorty, 1991, p. 29). In other words, a meaningful dialogue between communities which do not share basic values is futile, and Rorty argues that it is only important that each community "be responsible only to its own traditions, and not to the moral law as well" (1991, p. 199). This emphasis on ethnocentric solidarity as a method of making sense of one's life provides the basis for discerning how a postmodernist community might conduct social relations and, in so doing, address moral concerns.

Implications for Moral Education

What are the implications of postmodernist theory for moral education? This is a question worthy of investigation for two reasons. First, although scholars such as Aronowitz and Giroux (1991), and others, have proposed that a postmodernist approach to education may contribute to a more egalitarian society, the question of how adopting this approach would shape the theory and practice of moral education has yet to be explored within the literature on moral education. Second, although many postmodernists would no doubt consider this question irrelevant, since they suggest that terms like "moral are no longer very useful" (Rorty, 1989, p. 58), as long as human beings find themselves, in the course of interpersonal relations, asking "What ought I to do and how do I decide?" and as long as educational programs intend to facilitate decision-making of this kind, the task of working out postmodernism's implications for moral education remains a relevant enterprise.

My purpose in the remainder of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive analysis and critique of postmodernism's implications for moral philosophy, but rather to focus on some initial questions which provide a starting point for examining the implications of postmodernism for moral education. These key questions revolve around the issue of whether a moral education faithful to the central tenets of postmodern theory can adequately promote the ideals of democratic living. I will suggest that a justified critique of a postmodern approach to moral
education may be grounded in the argument that a postmodern approach to questions involving moral deliberation has the potential to violate the fundamental precepts of democratic living, and may therefore provide an inadequate framework for the theory and practice of moral education.

How do postmodernists propose that we address questions that might conventionally be described as moral? As might be expected, moral principles have little or no place in postmodernist discourse. The idea that an individual can step outside of the self to apply a rationally derived moral rule to a given situation is invalid. As such, the Kantian distinction between morality and prudence is false, because the objective rationality underlying the Kantian moral principle is itself an illusion. Once this claim is accepted, the concept of morality itself is dissolved.

Since the classic Kantian opposition between morality and prudence was formulated precisely in terms of the opposition between an appeal to principle and an appeal to expediency, is there any point in keeping the term ‘morality’ once we drop the notion of ‘moral’? (Rorty, 1989, p. 59)

As noted earlier, according to Rorty, it is through a free and open encounter within one’s ethnocentric community that norms for social behaviour ought to be derived. Norms only achieve legitimacy and justification through a communicative consensus within the community. The closest Rorty comes to defining what might conventionally be called morality is to echo the concept put forth by John Sellars who argues that morality is a matter of “we intentions”, with the immoral defined as “the sort of thing we don’t do” (cf. McGowen, 1991, p. 194). In essence, for Rorty the closest we can get to the truth in any given situation is to determine “the facts about what a given society, or profession, or other group, takes to be good ground for assertions of a certain sort” (cf. McGowan, 1991, p. 195).

From a postmodernist perspective, aside from a communal consensus, arriving at these assertions is process without any substantive criteria. Rorty states that, “We should avoid the idea that there is some special virtue in knowing in advance what criteria you are going to satisfy, in having standards by which to measure progress” (1991, p. 37). Further, he suggests that “...the goal of inquiry (in any sphere of culture) is the attainment of an appropriate mixture of unforced agreement with tolerant disagreement (where what counts as appropriate is determined, within that sphere, by trial and error)” (1991, p. 41).

What procedural guidelines would be followed in a moral education classroom which took its cue from postmodernist philosophy? First,
students would be encouraged to interrogate the values underlying the metanarratives of Western culture. The biases and power differentials inherent in this tradition would, in the process, be exposed. Second, students would be encouraged to recognize and affirm the plurality of voices, representing a variety of marginalized groups, as equally valid. Third, as students reflect upon and debate issues, they would be encouraged, in a free and open encounter, to reach (by trial and error) an agreement within their own ethnocentric groupings. Having done so, the students could happily deduce that their conclusions were fully justified and came as close as possible to approximating truth. Subsequent evaluation of these conclusions could only be based on ensuring that the "we intentions" of the particular ethnocentric community involved had been expressed. Although a postmodern framework for moral education of this kind could certainly be said to offer ample opportunity for students to exercise freedom of choice in moral decision-making, it also leaves open the possibility of affirming choices that are directly contrary to the foundations of democratic living.

While there are a variety of models of moral education embodying differing conceptions of morality, it is a truism that "moral education continues to be conceived and justified in the light of democratic principles" (Hersh, Miller, & Fielding, 1980, p. 13). These principles bestow individuals with certain inalienable rights regarding liberty, justice, and equality. In theory, democratic society is grounded, in part, on a commitment to these principles as ideals upon which individuals and institutions ought to govern their behaviour and mediate their disputes. As Guttman suggests,

Democracy must be understood not merely (or primarily) as a process of majority rule, but rather as an ideal of a society whose adult members are, and continue to be, equipped by their education and authorized by political structure to share in ruling. (Guttman, 1989, cf. Pearson, 1992, p. 84)

In this sense, in a democratic society, "moral thinking is essentially thinking about the fundamental values by which we profess to live" (Duncan, 1979).

Although many social and educational theorists have moved beyond strict adherence to modernist precepts, most contemporary accounts of the meaning of democracy and democratic education still presuppose that democracy cannot exist without strong commitments to the values of equality and social justice (Goodman, 1992). In order to apply criteria such as equality and justice to moral thinking, one must
rely on some form of critical and rational deliberation. Deliberation of this kind is at the very heart of democratic living. Guttman (1987) argues in her well-received and widely-cited work, *Democratic Education*, that the opportunity for critical and rational deliberation is an indispensable component of a democratic education.

She calls for 'critical deliberation' as a hedge against indoctrination; 'rational deliberation' to help children make hard choices where habits and authorities offer no clear guidance, or where laws violate the 'basic principles of democratic sovereignty....' (Weinstein, 1991, p. 10)

As I shall now suggest, rational deliberation, based on basic philosophical principles, is a necessary ingredient of a moral education that contributes to democratic living. Postmodernism may be justifiably questioned as a legitimate framework for moral education based on its rejection of such principles.

Contrasting the extreme antifoundationalism of postmodernism to the Enlightenment appeal to objectivity appears to set up an irreconcilable binary opposition. Or put another way, according to Rorty (1991), one can make sense of life by seeking either solidarity or objectivity. An example of a philosophical perspective that attempts to move beyond a rigid or highly formalistic conception of objectivity while maintaining a recognition of the importance of rationally derived principles as central to democratic living is Jurgen Habermas' (1987) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Although Habermas acknowledges that attempts at objective reason are created and exercised within the human mind, this in itself does not, in his view, obliterate distinctions between truth and falsity or right and wrong. Nor is the truth or the right simply the equivalent to what we might agree upon at a given time and place. While reason may be inescapably situated, this does not imply that we must dispense with it. Rather we must, according to Habermas, recognize the transcendent quality that claims of reason, truth, and justice represent to us as human beings. Thus, serving as humanely created ideals, reason, truth, and justice serve as a means through which traditions can be criticized and moral discourse mediated. In sum, although Habermas appears sympathetic to some aspects of postmodernism, he retains a reliance on objective reason as a grounding for democratic society.

According to Habermas, then, contemporary society is plagued by too little rather than too much reason. This brief sketch of Habermas' perspective toward the role of rationally derived principles in contributing to democratic living helps elucidate the central question that postmodernism raises for moral education. In order to contribute to the
creation and preservation of a democratic society, should moral educa-
tion encourage students to rigorously apply principles of reason, justice,
and equality as the modernist tradition would suggest? Or should stu-
dents be encouraged to dispense with such principles in favour of the
ethnocentric "we intentions" of postmodernism?

Although it is clearly an ethical necessity within a multicultural
world striving for equality between peoples to openly articulate, ac-
knowledge, and respect ethnocentric perspectives in moral deliberation,
such perspectives must, in a genuinely just society, ultimately pass the
test of legitimacy via the criteria of democratic principles.

As John Ralston Saul has recently observed:

One sign of a healthy Western civilization is that within a
relatively integrated moral outlook -- for example, agree-
ment on democratic principles -- a myriad of ideas and
methods are brought face to face, through civilized con-
flict the society's assumed moral correctness is constantly
tested. This tension -- emotional, intellectual, moral -- is
what advances the society. (1993, p. 135)

Thus, it is through the application of democratic principles that
moral correctness is tested in the deliberative process. The tensions
between a plurality of competing viewpoints are mediated through the
application of such principles and as a result the deliberative process is
explicitly intended to respect procedural guidelines which contribute to
democratic living. It is precisely in this regard that postmodernism may
provide an inadequate framework for moral education. Can a process of
moral deliberation that disregards principle satisfy the requirements of
genuinely democratic decision-making?

As noted earlier, postmodernism's rejection of the existence of
objective reason invalidates the justification of universal principles. As
Misgeld points out, even the attempt to justify a universal principle
which states that "[v]iolations of the personal and bodily integrity of
human beings are to be avoided at all costs", since "[n]o society which
accepts such violations can be said to be good", represents a definite
stance against postmodernism (1991, p. 17). A postmodernist framework
for moral education would, by necessity, discourage the evoking of the
above principle or any other. This is so because if a framework for moral
education endorses such a principle, it must also derive its legitimacy
from it. A pedagogy which endorsed even the most basic universal
principle would directly contradict the essence of postmodernism which
suggests that such principles are merely part of the deception of Enlight-
enment thinking. It is self-evident that a framework for moral education which sidesteps even a principle that addresses the personal and bodily integrity of human beings leaves the door open for "we intentions" that violate the fundamental precepts of democracy.

A postmodernist framework for moral education might be defensible if it provided some kind of procedural corrective for reflecting on "we intentions" that violated basic human values. One of the most disturbing aspects of postmodernism is that it has little or nothing to say in response to the charge that "we intentions" might lead to repression, discrimination, or other violations of human rights. As Pearson argues, "Ironically, a democratic society must prohibit the 'freedoms' to repress and discriminate in order to protect the freedoms of members of the society and to allow the reproduction of the society" (1992, p. 86). It is this very problematic conceptual void inherent within postmodernism that begs the question, "Which discourse would enable us to distinguish between reactionary and progressive possibilities in the postmodern criticism of culture?" (Misgeld, 1991, p. 18). It is only by reference to modernist principles of liberty, equality, and justice that such distinctions are possible.

Rorty's emphasis on the unforced agreement on the part of an ethnocentric community as the basis for developing social norms is also a potential threat to basic principles of democracy. Rorty argues that "there is no way to beat totalitarians in argument by appealing to shared common premises, and no point in pretending that a common human nature makes the totalitarians unconsciously hold such premises" (1991, p. 42). But what if the "we intentions" arising out of ethnocentric solidarity are themselves totalitarian? Indeed, it may be argued that although ethnocentric solidarity can contribute to community cohesiveness in the battle against injustice, it also has provided the impetus for violence and brutality in places such as the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and India, to name just a few. The progressive struggles for racial equality in the United States and South Africa, although boosted by a sense of ethnocentric solidarity, were grounded first and foremost in the demand for social justice as a universal right for all people. In a truly postmodernist world, this demand for social justice as a universal right would, at best, count only as one point of view among many others, no matter how totalitarian they might be.

As we move toward the end of the century, the social, technological, and economic fabric of Western society is in a state of transition. The postmodernists have certainly been correct in anticipating the need, in this new era, to recognize the plurality of convictions and world views, each of which represents a distinct set of voices calling for equality and
justice. The postmodernists are, however, mistaken in believing that a rejection of reason and morality will contribute to the attainment of social justice. On the contrary, if we are to pursue social justice in a society characterized by diversity, the ideals of a rational morality are indispensable as procedural mediators as the plurality of convictions inevitably clash. To do otherwise leaves the door open to a perpetual conflicting factionalism with little hope of a just society.

Should we be weary of postmodernism's implications for moral education? The preliminary analysis of this question, presented here, suggests that a postmodernist approach to moral education may be questioned on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of democratic moral deliberation. With regard to moral education, it is necessary to investigate in more detail how the progressive aspects of postmodernism might be reconciled with a continued commitment to the principles of democratic living. As I have noted, among the strengths of postmodernism is its insistence on recognizing and affirming the plurality of voices coexisting in a society characterized by social and moral diversity. Does mediating fundamentally different beliefs about what counts as legitimate means of moral deliberation necessarily require dispensing with modernist concepts of principle as postmodernists, such as Rorty, claim? Or can abstract principles of social justice which appear crucial to genuinely democratic decision-making adequately account for and respect ethnocentric diversity? As various forms of moral education challenge young people to address issues of social justice, and as postmodernism becomes an increasingly prominent mode of inquiry in Western educational institutions, these questions warrant further research.

REFERENCES


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