It is a tragic story from an infamous time. It's a horror that they did these things to children.

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John P. Portelli and Sharon Bailin (Editors)
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*Reason and Values: New Essays in Philosophy of Education* is the third such collection to appear in Canada during the last decade. Donald Cochrane's and Martin Shiralli's *Philosophy of Education: Canadian Perspectives* (1982) pointed to the influence of the "London Line," in general, and that of R. S. Peters, in particular, as the dominating force in Canada at the time. For Cochrane and Shiralli, the efforts of Peters were "very therapeutic" (p. 3) primarily because he was responsible for introducing "the astringent demands of ordinary language analysis and the methods and issues of British ethical theory and epistemology" (p. 4). In 1988 William Hare and John Portelli edited *Philosophy of Education: Introductory Readings*, a text intended for use in classes in philosophy of education for preservice teachers. As less than half the authors were Canadian and, indeed, it included a paper by Peters himself, *Introductory Readings* may be said to have carried on the "London Line." With *Reason and Values*, Portelli teams up with Sharon Bailin to both sample current work of the younger philosophers of education in Canada and to show that such current work, in the words of an introductory chapter by William Hare ("Continuity and Controversy in Philosophy of Education") addresses "substantive and normative issues in education more directly and explicitly, utilizing the sophisticated techniques which became part of the philosopher's repertoire in the analytic period but also drawing on the insights and principles of earlier philosophers of education" (p. 2). Hence the title: where "reason" draws attention to the analytical component in the new philosophy of education, "values" highlights its substantive and normative dimension. But has the "London Line" in fact been superceded in the new work?

The argument of the leading and keynote paper, Portelli's "Analytic Philosophy of Education: Development and Misconceptions," is straightforward. For Portelli, recent criticism of analytical philosophy in education has failed to take into account that after the mid-1960s, "with the work of Peters and his followers, an important shift took place in the way conceptual analysis was approached" (p. 22). What had happened was that "the issue
of value neutrality had been scrutinized, and its primacy abandoned" (p. 24). Further, according to Portelli, analytic philosophers of education, for the past twenty years, "have never maintained that analysis has a therapeutic function. All they claim is that by getting clearer about certain concepts we will be in a better position to adequately tackle educational issues" (p. 25).

As it happens, I was one of those recent critics of analytical philosophy of education. I maintained that analytical philosophy, whether before or after the 1960s, was never neutral in respect to values, as Portelli suggests. There are three ways one can view the activity of philosophical analysis in education. In its basic methodological sense, analytical philosophy seeks to examine the logical structure of arguments, listening for tacit background assumptions, and so on. In that sense, everyone practicing philosophical analysis of education today is an analytical philosopher. A second sense relates to the content or subject area of analysis in general and the legitimacy of the role of substantive or normative issues in education in particular. Few today would disagree that such issues constitute a legitimate object of analysis. There is, however, a third sense of philosophical analysis of education, one which relates to those background values guiding and informing the process of analysis in the first two senses. My claim is that Portelli's "important shift" was so only in respect to the second sense of philosophical analysis, that substantive and normative issues were now seen as legitimate objects of analysis in philosophy of education. Further, my claim is that while Peters and his followers invoked a normative position in respect to those substantive issues (sense two) which they did not have (or did not specify) they denied a normative position in the activity of analysis itself (sense three) which they did have.

Citing C. D. Hardie and D. J. O'Connor as his principal "pre-shift" philosophers, Portelli claims that,

The first analytical philosophers of education emphasized method. Although refuting a position on the grounds of inconsistency may have indirectly committed them to some position, they did not aim to defend any particular position. These philosophers felt that philosophers of education should take a neutral stance and that their role as philosophers was not to make practical suggestions. (p. 16)

Portelli's point is that philosophers prior to the mid-1960s practiced analysis in its neutral methodological, sense-one fashion, without raising substantive or normative issues. However, this will come as news to Hardie and O'Connor. For Hardie (1962) the traditional philosophers "have been exposed as impostors" (p. 209) while for O'Connor (1965) normative issues in education "should be recognised for what they are. An undiagnosed value judgement is a source of intellectual muddle" (p. 107). Far from taking a neutral stance, the logical-positivist background values (sense three) of
Hardie and O'Connor determined that statements for the truth of which neither any observation statement nor any axiom of mathematics was relevant was, in effect, meaningless. While, of course, since neither Hardie's nor O'Connor's own statements were derived from observation statements nor from the axioms of mathematics, their assertions, under the ruling, must also be meaningless and they themselves must be unmasked as impostors, the point here is that philosophical analysis in education was never the neutral activity Portelli portrays. This is true as well for the "post-shift" philosophers, but not in the fashion Portelli suggests.

One might cite "post-shift" philosophers of education who, Portelli notwithstanding, did maintain that conceptual analysis was therapeutic and value neutral. However a better way may be to show that Peters himself suggested that his practice of analysis (sense three) was indeed value neutral, while it was nothing of the sort. For Peters the "revolution in philosophy" heralded by Ludwig Wittgenstein had changed the nature of philosophy and the role of the philosopher himself. Modern science had eliminated philosophical speculation about the nature of the world. Post-revolutionary philosophers, therefore, would concern themselves only with the second-order clarification of those concepts which flourished at the first order. This would be done by the examination of the language in which those first-order concepts were embodied. For Peters (1966) the philosopher now had only a "spectatorial role" (p. 60), he could no longer "issue high level directives for education as well as pronounce on God, freedom, immortality, and the meaning of life" (1972; pp. 26-27). "To paraphrase Wittgenstein," Peters (1977) observed, "conceptual analysis leaves everything as it is" (p. 19). While analysis issues no directives, what it does do, according to Peters (1972), is "to spotlight the point at which decisions have to be made" (p. 17). All that is desired is "a detached and clear-sighted view of the shape of issues and institutions" (1966: p. 45). This clear-sighted view is obtained by examining ordinary language use. As concept possession, according to Peters (1970), "goes with the ability to use words appropriately, what we do is to examine the use of words in order to see what principle or principles govern their use. If we can make these explicit we have uncovered the concept" (p. 4).

While Peters' "spectatorial role" may permit him to raise normative issues for analysis, it also prevents him from issuing any high level directives. To say, for example, that education necessarily involves "worthwhile activities" (since that is what we mean when we say "education") does seem to fall short of what we mean when we say "normative." 3

While claiming a neutral, "spectatorial" role for the new philosopher, however, Peters was far from neutral in his exercise (sense three) of philosophical analysis. In an early critique of ordinary language philosophy, Ernest Gellner (1959) pointed out that: "The general public often supposes that Linguistic Philosophy is an attack on metaphysics. But metaphysics
was a red herring. In reality, it is simply an attack on thought” (p. 198). Peters is a linguistic philosopher. He shares the background values of linguistic philosophy: a naturalism contained in the view that the world is what it is and ordinary language reflects what it is - that is why confusions and perplexities will be dissolved once we “get clearer” about the use of words; paradoxically, there is also a nominalism contained in the view that meaning is derived from an infinite number of self-contained language games existing independently of any reference to an extra-linguistic reality and within which all “moves,” if performed in accordance with the “rules,” are legitimate; a conservative “nightwatchman” view of philosophy, on guard against all possible confusions and distortions of ordinary language; finally, an a priori bias, a pre-judging of the issues - analysis, in maintaining that once we have cleared up certain concepts we will be in a better position to tackle the issues (as Portelli does above) assumes that we can tell, without knowing what the real solutions will be, what the preconditions for their solution are. This is, of course, the question: If meaning is use and the varieties of usage are legion, whose usage is to be paradigmatic? Gellner amusingly but not, perhaps, untruthfully suggests, “The folk whose simple but sound folk-culture is being defended and preserved against specious, theoretical philosophy is the folk of North Oxford, roughly” (p. 239).

In spite of the fact that Portelli, in effect, has been defending analytical philosophy in education, particularly that after the mid-1960s, in contrast to those “traditional” forms which he implies it has superceded, he concludes, oddly, by stating that “one may get the impression that I am arguing that analytical philosophy of education is the only legitimate way of doing philosophy of education and that analytic philosophy of education has reached an ideal stage. This is not the case” (p. 26). One did rather get the impression that, if it had not yet quite reached an ideal stage, analytical philosophy of education was, for Portelli, the only legitimate way of doing philosophy of education. However, it turns out that what Portelli really maintains is that “there is no such single thing as the right method in philosophy – a view which does not amount to saying that any method is always of equal philosophical worth” (p. 26; italics in original). But if all philosophical methods are not of equal worth, then that implies criteria to distinguish one from the other, those methods which are more worthy from those which are less. Portelli has raised a substantive (sense two) issue. Will he give it (sense three) treatment by revealing his criteria of philosophical worth? Unfortunately, he does not reveal what those criteria might be. One can only suppose that they must go with the ability to use words like “philosophical worth” appropriately, and, if we can examine their use to see what principle or principles govern their use, only then will we have uncovered the concept.

Portelli’s paper endorses the “London Line” as exemplified in Peters’ linguistic philosophy. Where such philosophical analysis might raise substantive and normative questions in education, it does so only in the (sense
two) form of the examination of ordinary usage while concealing (sense three) the background values of a conservative linguistic naturalism in terms of which such analysis is conducted. Will the remainder of the papers in *Reason and Values* continue the "London Line?"

The second section of the book, "Reason and Critical Thinking," contains papers by Sharon Bailin and Mark Selman. Bailin’s "Rationality and Intuition" seeks to expose a "false dichotomy" between reasoning viewed "as always taking place within rigidly bounded and highly rule-governed frameworks" (p. 40), as opposed to intuition, where "the answer seems to come out of nowhere" (p. 39). Bailin maintains that "the absence of explicit conscious deliberation does not indicate that a process is not reasonable or rational" (p. 41). But is being reasonable equivalent to being rational? Does not being reasonable imply more than simply being rational? One might also ask whether this is still a real question after the work done by people like Polanyi in philosophical psychology. The interest, perhaps, is not so much in Bailin’s view that reason and intuition are not separate mental activities but rather in the way she shows this. In a manner which relies more on personal insight, she does not examine how we use words like "rationality" and "intuition" (and thereby departs from the "London Line"), nor does she slide into a thorough-going intuitionism which assimilates rationality to how we happen to feel about things. The object of Bailin’s analysis was to reveal "important educational implications." As a result of the rejection of the rationality-intuition dichotomy, Bailin concludes that "an emphasis on rationality does not imply routine performance, nor does it preclude affective engagement with the material studied" (p. 47). But didn’t we know that already?

Mark Selman’s "Critical Thinking as a Social Practice" marks a return to the "London Line." Set in a rather numbing dialogue form (the teacher-savant and his student-stooge) Selman seeks to show that people go wrong when they think "of good thinking as being good because it involves a certain sequence, a certain set of steps or operations" (p. 55). The reason people go wrong is that "terms such as ‘ability’ or ‘skill’ are used so casually and outside contexts in which they have their natural home" (p. 56). For Selman, words like "skill" and "ability" have their "natural home" in connection with public social practices rather than with following a certain set of steps or operations. But how did Selman know that was their "natural home?" Well, when one thinks critically one satisfies public standards of care, sensitivity, imagination, open-mindedness, fairness, and imagination. That is what it means, for Selman, to "think critically." Besides, Wittgenstein said so. It was, according to Selman, "one of the major kinds of errors that Wittgenstein took such effort to warn us about" (p. 56). Perhaps it’s time for us to be warned about Wittgenstein’s warning.

Section Three, "Values: Moral and Aesthetic," contains four papers. Eamonn Callan’s "Faith, Worship, and Reason in Religious Upbringing"
makes the unsurprising claim that one cannot, simultaneously, endorse the “rational critical principle,” that is, “the assent we are entitled to give to a set of claims in the field of religion should be appropriate to the strength of the arguments and evidence relevant to its truth” (p. 67), while engaging in “wholehearted acts of religious worship” (p. 69). It is unsurprising since it is the rational critical principle and not those wholehearted acts which determine what shall count as appropriate arguments and evidence.

Do women tend to respond more readily to situations requiring benevolence and men more readily to those requiring justice? And if situations requiring benevolence tend to elicit a direct response while situations requiring justice tend to elicit a response based on duty, does this mean that such tendencies mirror a private (benevolence: connection) - public (justice: separation) split based on gender lines? Debra Shogun (“Gender and Moral Agency”) maintains, contrary to some feminist theorists, that there is not a simple gender alignment between care and connection on the one hand and justice and separation on the other. For Shogun, “Women’s tendency to connect may indicate that women tend to respond directly to others in moral situations requiring either benevolence or justice. Men’s tendency to separate from others by emphasizing autonomy and rights may, on the other hand, be an indication that men tend to respond to duty rather than directly to those in moral situations” (p. 90). Shogun concludes that if there are these gender differences in response to moral situations, then “boys, more than girls, may require more regular, prolonged attention to people in moral dilemmas” (p. 91). Yes, they may. But is this an empirical or an impressionistic point Shogun is making? Women’s tendency to connect “may” indicate a direct response; men’s tendency to separate “may” indicate a response based on duty; boys “may” require more attention to people in moral dilemmas. Allan Bloom (1988) once pointed out in respect to feminist writing, that there is “a mystique around all the related issues, requiring that men have to change” (p. 70). Placed as it is in the conditional, Shogun’s paper may constitute a contribution to that mystique.

Good art, for Plato, must serve a moral purpose. Indeed, he would ban works of art from his Republic which were seen to undermine its moral fibre. In what is now seen by some as an illegitimate move, he wanted to apply the principles of morality to those of aesthetics. Sharon Bailin (“The Bad and The Beautiful”) wants to explore “whether the notion of appreciation, which is a central concept of aesthetics, might also be a fruitful concept for illuminating the moral realm, and might be a useful notion for moral education” (p. 93). Bailin wants to apply the principles of aesthetics to those of morality. The reason she wants to do this is because feminist theorists have taken issue with the view that the aim of moral reasoning is to reach agreement where claims conflict. They have asserted, as Bailin does here, the need for an “alternative moral theory, one which puts relationships at the
centre, which emphasizes the role of caring and emotion, and which asserts the importance of the concrete particulars of moral agents and moral situations" (p. 95). As Bailin points out, however, the central function of aesthetic judgements "is to foster appreciation of the work in question and this does not necessarily entail arriving at a conclusion or agreement between parties" (p. 96). Further, she observes that "although appreciation seems to be an end in itself for aesthetic discussion, it is not enough to appreciate a moral situation for its own sake. One also has to act" (p. 100). Then what is the point of applying the notion of appreciation to the moral realm? For Bailin, it "might help us to see that caring and empathy are not incompatible with principles and rational morality, but that they are, rather, complimentary” (p. 101). But has anyone ever said that they were not compatible?

Stuart Richmond’s “Once Again, Art Education, Politics, and the Aesthetic Perspective” might be read as a reply to Bailin’s attempt to employ the aesthetic perspective in the moral realm. For Richmond, the aesthetic realm is autonomous and so, presumably is the moral. The aesthetic perspective “focuses attention on art as a subject of study in its own right, rather than on art as a means for the transmission of messages that more properly become the object of interest” (p. 106). With the pluralism of cultural perspectives following attempts to deconstruct traditional curriculum patterns along political, social or gender lines, arguments citing the importance of the aesthetic perspective in any broadly valid sense become, for Richmond, “a cause for embarrassment, a sign of the speaker’s attachment to discredited conceptions, or perhaps a sign of intellectual naivety” (p. 106), Richmond is against the view that value in art is relative to group interest, a view contained in Bailin’s harnessing the aesthetic perspective to that “alternative moral theory.” For if morality adopts the aesthetic perspective and the aesthetic perspective is relative to this or that group’s preferences, then the feminist perspective must thereby assume parity with traditional moral forms.

Is literacy a double-edged sword? In addition to its liberating qualities, can it be used also to cultivate passivity and powerlessness? Suzanne de Castell’s “Literacy as Disempowerment: The Role of Documentary Texts,” the first of two papers on the fourth section, “Literacy,” claims that this is just the role of school texts which “function as evidence of the truth, not as explanations of it. Textbooks are treated like documents: they are not to be challenged, neither are they to be interpreted” (p. 122). All knowledge, for de Castell is socially constructed, but where no distinctions are made between facts and constructed factual statements, such documentary texts produce homogenized “communities of knowers, all of whom know ‘the same thing’” (p. 124). The distinguishing feature of such “communities of knowers” is their passivity. In de Castell’s view, the text functions as “a
potent form of mass-scale epistemological socialization into a particular intransitive relation to documentary reality” (p. 124). A “critical de-interpretation must be in order,” de Castell concludes, “if textbook knowledge is to be comprehended, rather than simply parroted back in assignments and exams” (p. 125). In her call for “critical de-interpretation,” de Castell reveals herself as an empowerment theorist, one bent on liberating passive Canadian “communities of knowers” whom she appears to view as a northern variety of Friere’s Brazilian peasant. However, no evidence is forthcoming that they all know the “same thing” (whatever that might be), or that all they do is parrot back textbook knowledge in exams and assignments. Again, how does de Castell know that no “critical de-interpretation” occurs in classrooms. Where are the actual teachers, the students? Is de Castell just making an impressionistic point? And if all texts are either fictional or documentary as de Castell claims, then her own text must itself be documentary (although there might be an argument here), functioning to disempower the reader and turning us all into passive “communities of knowers.”

The “crux of the meta-problem” in the teaching of literature, for Deanne Bogdan (“Toward a Rationale for Literary Literacy”), is “the gap now existing between transformation and enculturation as the two related but discrete goals of literature education” (p. 134). How can literature education steer a path between initiation into the values and ideals of social identity achieved through a traditional pedagogy of detached literary analysis while, at the same time, taking into account the new goals of reader-response theory embodied in a pedagogy of class discussion and journal writing aimed at the validation of the experience of minorities and women? Bogdan takes issue with the “humanist legacy of the 19th century, in which the ‘right’ values wrought by the moral-literary sensibility were deemed to emanate from the study of literature sui generis” (p. 134). Bogdan’s point is that for current theorists wishing to attain multicultural sensitivity through the literature curriculum, “the power of literary naming, the emotional force of literature, is still regarded as unproblematic” (p. 137). While such naming can culminate in validation, it can also result in alienation. Is Bogdan an “enculturationist” or a “transformationist?” The issue reduces to what one means by “literary literacy.” For Bogdan, the concept “would embrace both engagement and detachment, both the feeling of coming to know certain ‘truths’ about oneself and/or the world, and getting distance on that feeling” (p. 142). Bogdan, it seems, is both.

In “Democracy and Schooling,” the first paper in the last section, “Autonomy: The Student and the Teacher,” Eamonn Callan argues that “extensive student participation in the government of schooling, and perhaps even full-blown democratic schooling, become reasonable policies to adopt under conditions that should not be difficult to bring about” (p. 151).
For Callan, such participation should extend to the point that it does not encroach destructively on teaching. It is incumbent on those against such participation, he maintains, "to show that there are special features of authoritative decision-making in schooling such that student participation is or is likely to be incompetent, even in the circumstances I am considering" (p. 159). Callan raises and meets the objections of those against extending authority to the students, particularly the argument based on the principle of competence. Since, for Callan as for Aristotle, educational ends are realized within the processes through which we pursue them, maximizing student competence in decision-making necessarily follows from the view "that schooling should be centrally concerned with encouraging autonomy" (p. 166). Have schools, in fact, achieved little in the way of encouraging such autonomy? In that case, for Callan, "there is little point either to their efforts or to the authority structure of schooling itself" (p. 168). So much for the schools. But Callan's argument simply presupposes the validity of its premise, that is, that the encouragement of autonomy is the central concern of the school. Curiosity compelled me to take a poll of the teachers at my secondary school. Only two of those who responded identified what could be construed as "autonomy" as the principal aim of education. Well, so much for the teachers.

On reading the title of John Portelli's "Dare We Expose the Hidden Curriculum?" one might suppose some startling revelation was in store. This is not the case. In a return to (sense two) analytical philosophy of education, Portelli merely seeks to examine the various ways we can use the word "hidden" in connection with the curriculum, and to recommend that once we have become aware of something which is hidden, we make it explicit in the interests of trustful teacher-student relations. That is all. In examining what it means to be "hidden," Portelli constructs a calculus of permutations and combinations existing between teacher and student involving whether the learning was intended and/or recognized by the teacher and whether such learning was recognized by the student. There are some eight possible combinations using these variables, and Portelli examines each one. If one wonders why he did this, reference must be made to one of the first principles of linguistic philosophy. In Portelli's words, "Although one usually refers to the hidden curriculum, which may give the impression that there is some universal essence of the concept, the analysis clearly identifies different kinds of hiddenness which arise from different contexts involving different relationships between at least the teacher, students, and what is learnt" (p. 179). But if there is no universal essence of the concept, how, to paraphrase Peters (1970, p. 31) paraphrasing Wittgenstein on the concept of "games," does Portelli "know which samples to lay out in order to look for similarities?" Independently of his possession of the concept of "curriculum" in terms of which such variations were deemed appropriate, in other words, how did Portelli know which variations
of relationships between teacher, students, and what is learnt to analyze? Finally, the concept “hidden curriculum” for most of us means instruction implicitly conveyed along with the visible curriculum, that neither teacher nor students explicitly recognize it. With such recognition, the hidden curriculum is no longer hidden. It becomes part of the visible curriculum. With his calculus, involving as it does explicit teacher/student recognition, one wonders whether Portelli himself is in possession of the concept.

Why are teachers disempowered? Why have calls for greater teacher empowerment contained in studies such as the Holmes Group had such limited results? For Murray Ross (“Teacher Empowerment: Unmasking Disciplinary Power”) the answer lies in the fact that “teacher empowerment arguments which aim at liberating teachers from Weberian cages of bureaucracy fail to appreciate the debilitating effects of expert discourse” (p. 199). What has happened, according to Ross, is that it is not bureaucratic or “juridical” power, political power granted to those who have earned the right to exercise it which has disempowered teachers, but rather it is “disciplinary” power, power exercised in the form of the “normalizing discourses of educational research.” Such normalizing discourses serve to infantilize both students and teachers. With process-product research (time-on-task; effective classroom management techniques, etc.) “students are not expected to think critically about what their teachers tell them or about the contents of their texts. Therein lies the maintenance of immaturity in students” (p. 206). In the case of teachers, teacher effectiveness research “is a rudimentary attempt to standardize the way teachers teach. It represents an effort to establish pedagogical norms of effectiveness which would be definitive of good practice and the means by which poor teaching could be identified” (p. 206). Such process-product and teacher effectiveness research has resulted in an environment of “subtle coercions” which “lessen the status of teachers and enhance the prestige and power of those who will diagnose, then set out to solve the problems generated in the disciplined environment” (p. 210). The solution, for Ross, lies in teachers “taking a critical stance toward educational research which sets out to develop universally valid generalizations regarding the best way to teach and learn” (pp. 211-212).

One’s immediate reaction to Ross’ “subtle coercions” is that he vastly over-estimates the impact of educational research on the classroom teacher. There are two reasons for this. The first is that teachers, on the whole, are not intellectuals in the sense that they do not read journals of education in which the results of such educational research might be found. That is simply the case. The second reason is an extension of the first, the thorough-going pragmatism of the classroom teacher. While teachers might become indirectly aware of such results from “in-service” sessions or from administrative directives, there is a generally profound suspicion of all such
initiatives coupled with a specific sense of their irrelevance to classroom practice. Such attributes may cause despair in university departments of education, but they do serve to inoculate the classroom teacher against those "subtle coercions." There need be no fear that Ross' "critical stance" (while perhaps not quite in the form he envisages it) in respect to that educational research which sets out to develop universally valid generalizations regarding the best way to teach and learn will collapse in the face of those "normalizing discourses."

With the increasing pressure placed on schools to produce a skilled workforce able to compete in a society in the process of being transformed from industrial to service production, demands for the re-organization of the teaching profession are likewise increasing in intensity. Responses to these demands for change range from new models of the "reflective practitioner," the restructuring of teacher education in the universities, to the re-organization of the profession itself. It is in respect to the last response, particularly that embodied in "Teacher Education in Ontario: Current Practice and Options for the Future," that Howard Woodhouse ("Teachers, Professionalism, and Critical Autonomy") directs his attention. The report envisions an expanded role for experienced teachers. Freed of much of their classroom responsibilities, these teachers would be involved with curriculum construction, school administration, and enforcement of standards of teaching practice. For Woodhouse, this kind of response to the re-organization of the profession "would do irreparable harm to education" (p. 216). This is so, according to Woodhouse, for two different but related reasons: (1) because the report's account of professionalism is "inconsistent and likely to hinder the teaching process" (p. 217), and (2) because the proposal's call for teachers to become "reflective, critical and inquiring" presupposes a personal autonomy eliminated by its account of professionalism. For Woodhouse, the report proposes to replace the individual autonomy of teachers with a collectivist professionalism "that is quite likely to be more tyrannical than the present system" (p. 218). The abandonment of the teacher's personal autonomy "entails the denial of education as a process of independent inquiry within and among the various disciplines comprising the curriculum" (p. 218). Woodhouse sees the report as recommending nothing less than "a throwback to an earlier age of guilds that held a monopoly over the knowledge that they possessed and exerted secrecy over that knowledge, as well as over strict methods of induction into the patriarchal brotherhood" (p. 219). Teachers, for Woodhouse, require the status of independent practitioners. This is because the foundational disciplines they teach "demand such autonomy if they are to be practiced in ways that enhance the growth of teachers and students alike" (p. 221) and because of their "pedagogical knowledge gained from the discipline of education and the practice of teaching itself" (p. 221). The report, in Woodhouse's view, "deprives teachers of the very personal autonomy that is integral to being
professional” (p. 221). Woodhouse’s second point, that the proposal’s call for teachers to become reflective and critical thinkers is rendered inoperative in the absence of such personal autonomy, leads him to his conclusion that if “teachers were afforded greater opportunities to engage with their students in critical inquiry, in the sense of asking questions about both disciplines and reality that shows either to be in need of revision, then schools would become dynamic places that encourage the open, critical and reflective discussion of ideas and the openness to student interests and needs that is too often lacking in schools today” (p. 225).

As with Eamonn Callan’s student autonomy and Murray Ross’ critical stance, one feels again a certain slippage between department of education theory and actual classroom practice. With Woodhouse’s claim that reform of the teaching profession will come not by means of the formation of some new hierarchical pedagogical guild but rather through the personal transformation of teachers themselves, one senses a background theory of either unreconstructed “ivory-towerism” or a profound conservatism. In other words, is his picture of the classroom teacher engaging his students with questions which show either his discipline or reality to be in need of revision quite right? Exactly what, in Woodhouse’s view, will serve as the basis for the personal transformation of teachers? If Woodhouse is against the present system, lacking as it is in critical and reflective discussion of ideas and openness to student interests on the one hand, and the hierarchical guild as proposed by the Ontario study on the other, what exactly is he proposing? What are Woodhouse’s recommendations for the reformation of the teaching profession? We never do find out.

Reason and Values: New Essays in Philosophy of Education is not optional reading for those in the field. In addition to revealing an overview of current developments in the discipline itself, in the present case a gradual departure although not yet a complete break with the “London Line,” Reason and Values provides a snapshot of (sense three) philosophical analysis in education, that is, an insight into those background values guiding and informing the process of analysis itself as exercised by its most prominent Canadian practitioners. In the same way, for those in the field in the broader sense, for those who are either practicing or intending classroom teachers, Reason and Values provides at least part of that theoretical dimension required of the “reflective practitioner.” Finally, where issues in education and their study have become one of today’s most important concerns, Reason and Values provides the basis for an intelligent appreciation of those issues for the general reader.
NOTES


2. For example, R.D. Archambault (1972) praises the therapeutic qualities of analysis as involving “the treatment of common puzzles” (p. 5). Israel Scheffler (1958) points out that “in applying analytical methods in philosophy what we are concerned with is with the removing of perplexities that arise in our attempt to say systematically and clearly what we are doing in education and why” (p. 4). Jonas Soltis (1968) claims that “Peters clearly exemplifies the stance of neutrality as well as the technique of asking revealing prior questions” (p. 14).

3. David Adelstein (1972) has stated that “conceptual analysis, in determining how we decide what is ‘worthwhile,’ begins by asking why some subjects are taught on the curriculum and others are not. The existing system is taken, therefore, as already containing the reasons: it is merely a matter of elucidating them. Why, for example, teach science, history, and literary criticism, rather than games? Well, the former, Peters shows us, have a whole range of words associated with them, ‘far ranging cognitive content’, ‘progressive development’, ‘excellence’, etc. which games do not have. We always suspected there was a reason for studying science rather than cricket, and this is it.” (p. 133)


5. The question read: “Would it be possible, in no more than one sentence, for you to indicate what you believe is the main goal or aim of secondary education? (More general than ‘learn some history’; more specific than ‘intellectual, moral and spiritual development’.)” In spite of the fact that only one sentence was asked for, only sixteen out of over one hundred teachers replied.

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