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*Lagos Morning Post, April 1965.*

University Autonomy and the Expatriate Teacher

— Observations on a Crisis —

*H.D. Morrison*

In spite of the fact that Canadian universities do not appear to be able to staff their own rapidly growing departments with Canadian citizens, Canadian university teachers in steadily increasing numbers are storing their furniture, inoculating their children for cholera and yellow fever, labelling their luggage with exotic names like Addis Ababa, Kuala Lumpur, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, or Lusaka, and disappearing for two or three years at a time. Some of these teachers are unsponsored, some have UNESCO appointments, but the great majority of them are teaching abroad, either directly or indirectly, under the auspices of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), formerly known as the Department of External Aid. No matter how their appointments are made, they can be sure of one thing: while abroad they will have to make some important personal decisions with little precedent to guide them.

It probably does not occur to many of these academic travellers to try to find the answers to some important questions before they leave Canada. What kinds of problems are likely to arise on a foreign assignment? Will I be teaching in an autonomous university or will I be teaching in an institution little more than a department of the ministry of education? Will I be as free to teach and
to conduct research as I have been at home? If my salary is to be paid to me directly by the Canadian Government, will I be a temporary civil servant? And what does that fact mean professionally? If Ottawa pays my salary indirectly through my home university, does that fact alter my position? If I have an administrative appointment in my new university (departmental chairman, dean) does this mean I shall become heavily involved in the politics, internal or external, of the university?

It is reasonably easy to answer factual questions about the degree of academic freedom enjoyed by the staff of the University of Zambia, but it is difficult to offer sound advice on what to do if this freedom is curtailed. It is easy to suggest what are some of the problems one will face in an African university, but difficult to offer advice on how to face these problems. As in the study of history, anyone can have an opinion; but the art is too imprecise, there are too many variables, to formulate laws or rules. I remember an old Africa-hand summing up his years of experience on that continent: “In Africa you cannot assume that because the sun rose in the east this morning that it will rise in the east tomorrow morning.” He was trying to tell me, of course, that in Africa God moves in a mysterious way, and that without a measure of fatalism, of resiliency, of “unflappability” one should not teach there. Allow me to outline at some length a situation I found myself in four years ago, in the hope that, from the study of the anatomy of a crisis, some lessons might be learned.

In July of 1964 I assumed the duties of professor of education in the two-year old University of Lagos, the second (after Ibadan) federal government university in Nigeria. By the terms of agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, I remained a member of the staff of McGill University, seconded to the University of Lagos, but paid by McGill; and McGill was, in turn, reimbursed by Ottawa. Thus, a Canadian citizen, a member of the staff of a Canadian university, paid indirectly by the Government of Canada, held a seat on the most important policy-making body in a Nigerian university, the senate. In fact, twenty out of the twenty-nine members of senate were not citizens of Nigeria, neither were their skins black, a fact that did not go unnoted in the local press. A front-page editorial
in the Lagos *Morning Post* of April 6, 1965 provides an example of the sort of drubbing we paleskins absorbed from a portion of the Nigerian press:

If these scrubbed hogs in their own countries have a license to defy their own Prime Ministers, we should bring it home to them that the reverse is true in this country. . . . These men have shamed all that the Commonwealth stands for and should be roundly condemned.

I submit that the "scrubbed hog" part is fair comment, but the rest is arguable. However, we had our supporters, as in this excerpt from Peter Pan's column in the Lagos *Daily Times* of April 5, 1965:

The Provisional Council and its fellow travellers want to get it into their heads that academicians are an international commodity . . . It is downright imbecility to sneak up a camouflage of so-called white interference to arouse stupid national pride.

If we peer through the hyperbole, which is such an interesting and sometimes frustrating part of African journalism, we find that these two persons are saying something serious. The editorialist is saying, "These expatriate teachers, even though they may have the right to challenge authority in their own countries, have no right to do so in Nigeria." Peter Pan, the leading columnist in Nigeria in 1965, is saying, "The provisional council of the university is trying to discredit the stand taken by the expatriate teachers on grounds of their non-citizenship, and expatriates will refuse to teach in Nigeria if this sort of criticism continues." I remember distinctly, just at the time when this newspaper-war was at its height, and when we were all in need of a little assurance, a Yoruba lecturer saying to me in private conversation, "If the expatriate teachers were not here to help us, the university could not long maintain its freedom from the corruption of politics that we see in the government every day." These three people are referring to a period in the history of the University of Lagos which brought violence, bloodshed, closure of the university for seven months, a number of court cases, and the possibility that the standards of the university have been lowered for years to come.
The University of Lagos began its teaching program in 1962 under a provisional charter from the Federal Government. To the three original faculties (Medicine, Business Administration, Law) were added in 1964 four more (Arts, Science, Education, Engineering). A staff of about ninety taught a student body of just under four hundred. About forty of the staff were white expatriates, some of the appointments were direct, while others were made through a variety of organizations such as the UK Ministry of Overseas Development, USAID, Canadian External Aid, and UNESCO. Among the universities sponsoring individual staff and departments one found such names as Trinity College Dublin, London, McGill, Toronto, UCLA, Budapest, New York University, and Fordham. The general responsibility for the university lay in the hands of a government-appointed provisional council, on which were seven Yorubas of the Western Region (in which lies the Federal District of Lagos). The senate (consisting of nine Nigerians and twenty expatriates) was given complete authority over the academic affairs of the university. The Prime Minister appointed to the vice-chancellorship Dr. Eni Njoku, a highly respected scholar, administrator, and former chairman of the Department of Botany at Ibadan. Many observers have stated that in their opinion the University of Lagos enjoyed a more auspicious start than had any other university in tropical Africa and, if this is true, it is my belief that Dr. Njoku was more responsible for this success than any other individual.

The Crisis in the University

February is a fascinating month in Lagos because it marks the end of months of dry-season sun; and the onset of the rains is heralded by evening thunder storms, seen at first on the northern horizon, but creeping south, closer and closer each evening. As we sat on our verandahs watching the great black clouds illuminated by constantly-flickering lightning, and listening to the distant, ominous muttering of thunder, little did we realize that a storm of a different nature was developing, a storm that would bring all teaching in the university to a halt for half a year, would ruin the careers of many students, and would change the lives of all expatriate staff. The university crisis began with what appeared to be a minor case of university politics, but soon developed into a
full-scale confrontation between senate and council.

The seemingly innocent beginning of the affair was the arrival of a short letter from council to senate pointing out to senate that the three-year term of Dr. Njoku as vice-chancellor was coming to an end in May, that by statute senate must be consulted on any new appointment, and that senate was therefore requested to nominate three names for consideration by council. Senate thought there was something suspicious about this move by council because senate and council had agreed months earlier that Dr. Njoku would be re-appointed, and his name, accordingly, had been proposed for this position in the report on which the legislation setting up the permanent constitution of the university was to be based. Members of council let it be known that the request was simply a matter of form, made necessary by the fact that the legislation providing for Njoku's re-appointment had not yet been passed. In no mood to take chances, senate replied to council's invitation by nominating one name only — that of Dr. Eni Njoku. Senators went to bed with the feeling that they had saved the university. But, somehow, the thunder in the north was ominously louder and closer.

On Monday, March 1, 1965, the morning papers startled literate residents of Nigeria with great black headlines announcing that council had appointed Dr. S. O. Biobaku to the vice-chancellorship of the University of Lagos. The headlines were very big and very black because the newspapers knew the tribal and political implications of this move. A Yoruba-dominated council had ousted an Ibo from one of the top academic positions in Nigeria. The West African Pilot of March 1 expressed the feelings of all Ibos in this headline: "Another Shock for Ibos. Njoku Forced Out of Varsity Job." That was the situation exactly. Naked tribalism had reared its head in the university world of Nigeria, about the last area of the country where it had not hitherto been troublesome. Nigerians now began taking sides, not on academic or legalistic grounds, but on the emotions of tribalism. Nigerian tribalism is like the tribalism in Ulster, built on prejudice and passion. And, as the Irish say, the more prejudice the better the passion. Ibos supported the university senate and Njoku; Yorubas supported council in its nomination of their tribal brother, Biobaku. The expatriate staff and the Nigerians not tribally committed supported the senate almost to a man.
The press, the City of Lagos, the whole country of fifty million seemed to take sides, and the newspapers had good headlines and stories for the next five months.

Predictably, soon after the newspapers announced the appointment of the new vice-chancellor, the students of the university declared that they were on strike. It is interesting that even the Yoruba students supported the pro-Njoku strike at first because they had obviously not been properly briefed by their tribesmen. The strike took the form of a "sit-in" and, with all entrances to the university piled high with classroom furniture, teaching was effectively stopped. The chairman of the provisional council called on the deans of the university to stop the strike, and told them that they would be held responsible for any disorders. When the students refused to end the strike, council suspended them all and closed the university for an indefinite time. The students took court action against council on the grounds that only senate had the authority to suspend them — and won their case. Council tried to reopen the university on April 7 but senate, on the recommendation of the deans, refused to permit teaching in an atmosphere of violence, since it was planned that police would be present in the lecture halls to keep order. Representations were made by senate to the Prime Minister and to the Sardauna of Sokoto to use their influence to get council to mediate, but to no avail. The Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (soon to be murdered in the first military coup), in a newspaper interview made after the crisis had been settled, commented that it was a pity, but it was the nature of politicians to want to control everything. This statement by the Prime Minister swept away the legalistic posturings of council that there was nothing tribal or political in its action.

Tribalism and Politics

It had not dawned on us non-Nigerians at the university at first that there was more to this matter than petty tribalism within the walls of the university. All the evidence now pointed to the conclusion that a major political party, already conceded to be heavily involved in election scandals, was attempting a take-over of the University of Lagos. The method was simple. They had bypassed the insulation (National Universities Commission) intended
to protect all Nigerian universities from political influence by gaining control of the provisional council, and they were now in the process of putting their man into the vice-chancellorship. With a university in your pocket, you can go to the Yoruba electors and say, "Look what our Party has done for the Yoruba people; vote for us because there is more to come." With a university under "control" you have a source of "diverted" funds for the party, a place where party stalwarts can be rewarded, where the tribal unemployed can be employed, all conditions known to exist in most Nigerian government corporations, and in some of the ministries. Many observers of the Nigerian scene in the middle 1960's thought that tribalism and political corruption would be the downfall of Nigeria. How right they were! At the University of Lagos in 1965 we were participating in some of the heavy skirmishing that developed into the First Military Coup (the murder of Sir Abubakar), the Second Military Coup (the murder of General Ironsi), and the present Biafran War.

At the university neither council nor senate would budge from its original position. The period was characterized by attempts on both sides to win public support through news releases, paid advertisements, and pamphlets. Meetings of senate were always lively. At one, the Registrar accused one of the expatriate professors of planning to murder him! The Nigerian police broke up another meeting at the request of council on the grounds that meetings of senate were illegal when the university was closed. The six deans of the university were accused by council of being the ringleaders against "duly constituted authority" and were threatened with dismissal. A mass meeting of all senior staff was held, and most of the expatriate staff and most of the non-Yoruba Nigerians threatened to resign if even one dean was illegally dismissed. The newly-appointed Minister of Education threatened the UNESCO Dean of Engineering with expulsion from the country, an action that must surely be rare in UNESCO circles. The Prime Minister stopped this ploy when he was informed of the attempt, but the fact that it happened at all suggests the disunity in the Government.

Finding that their threat of dismissal had not had a suitable effect on the six deans, council followed through on its threat and dismissed them, "subject to legal argument." A chain reaction followed, and all of the staff who had threatened to resign did, in
fact, resign. Dr. Biobaku took over officially as vice-chancellor on June 1, and on June 7 council tried again to reopen the university. This attempt collapsed in violence when the new vice-chancellor was stabbed by a knife-wielding student in a scuffle following the new vice-chancellor's mostly inaudible inaugural address in the assembly hall. The tragedy, of course, lay in the fact that the final year students, those who had been first-year students when the university opened its doors, were unable to finish their courses or write their exams; and many of them will never have another chance to get "The Golden Fleece," as degrees are called in Nigeria.

An even greater tragedy for Nigeria was the set-back suffered by the young university when about half, by far the best qualified half, of the senior staff resigned or were dismissed. It was sad to make the evening pilgrimages in the summer of 1965 to Ikeja Airport to say farewell to family after family of those who were leaving. It was sad to see the big VC 10's thundering off into the tropical night with the top intellectuals of the university, and many Nigerians came to the airport to say goodbye because they felt the same way about it. One wondered how the university could possibly open in September lacking the most-experienced half of its staff. Universities in the USA, Canada, and the United Kingdom were approached to help with staff, but all refused when it became known that the University of Lagos had dismissed staff illegally. However, desperate men take desperate measures. A number of rather surprised lecturers found themselves in the professorial ranks, and a number of graduate students from other Nigerian universities suddenly found offers of appointments at Lagos. The university opened in the fall, but I think it will be some years before Lagos offers Ibadan much competition academically.

Some Reflections

One might fairly ask the question as to whether or not senate was justified in carrying on the fight to the point where the university was a wreck. Was the cure worse than the disease? Perhaps we should take a closer look at the "disease." There is no doubt that the whole affair began when a few conniving politicians worked on the tribal loyalties of the Yoruba members of the provisional council and persuaded them to replace an Ibo with a Yoruba, and council thought they had found a way of doing it that was legal, or semi-legal, at worst. But when the struggle developed to the
point where the government and even the churches became involved, and when it became apparent that the expatriate members of senate were leading the opposition to council, the struggle took on a *racial* complexion. One of the members of council said to a British friend of mine (who had nothing at all to do with the university): “How would they like it if a black man tried to tell Oxford who it could or could not have as vice-chancellor!” And so one had these charges of neo-colonialism and overtones of racism clouding the main issue. And few Yorubas dared to back down from the official pro-Biobaku stand because, as one of my Yoruba colleagues said to me, “I would be forever finished with my people.”

Why did senate put up such a fight? At first the attention of senate was focused on the constitutional aspects of the situation. The vice-chancellor of the University of Lagos was not only the chief administrative officer, he was also the chief academic officer. The constitution had recognized this fact when it provided that the appointment of a vice-chancellor could be made by council “after consideration of a report by senate.” Senate claimed that the appointment of Dr. Biobaku was unconstitutional in that senate had not reported on, nor had been asked to report on, Dr. Biobaku. Senate had good reason to have doubts about his fitness to be vice-chancellor. Dr. Biobaku, although a recognized authority on Yoruba history, had never held a teaching post in a university. In 1964 when the University of Ife in western Nigeria was involved in its own crisis, Dr. Biobaku issued his “credo” on university government: “I wish to say most categorically, however, that the authorities of the university have only one policy and that is to support the government of the day to which the university looks up for sustenance.” He went on to say that any staff who could not support this idea should resign. The second reason senate fought the new appointment was on the issue of tribalism in university life. To senate, and not only to the white members of senate, the issue was whether or not tribalism, the curse of modern Nigeria, was to be allowed to influence appointments in the University of Lagos, an institution where appointments had hitherto been extremely fair. Some feared that it would not be long before the tribalism which was now apparent at the top would enter the students’ halls of residence. And when it became apparent to all that tribalism was a tool being used by a political party to capture con-
control of the university, a third motive for resisting council appeared. Most senators thought that if the battle to keep politics out of the university was not fought now, and won now, the battle would be lost forever. Politics on the Nigerian scene in 1965 meant the search for power, and power meant nepotism, the ten-percent commission, and the Swiss bank account. (Nigerian politicians believed in Lord Acton’s well-known saying, but with a slight variation: “Power tends to corrupt; absolute power tends to be absolutely delightful!”) Ultimately, then, and very idealistically, senate was resisting the corruption of the university by the same forces that were corrupting the rest of Nigerian life.

Each expatriate with a seat on the senate of the university had to take a position in this struggle; there was no way out. If you supported the position of the provisional council you were saying that in spite of the fact that the majority of senate, of the senior staff, and of the students were against a change in the vice-chancellorship, nevertheless, legal niceties aside, council was entrusted with the general responsibility for the university and could appoint whomever they wished. On the other hand, if you supported the stand taken by the six deans and by the majority of senate, you were saying that council had appointed a man to be the top academic officer in the university without asking the opinion of the supreme academic body in the university as to his suitability for the position, and had therefore insulted both staff and students. There is, of course, a third position: one could say, in effect, “I am a foreigner; I came here to teach and to conduct research in a new university. If the Nigerians want to fight each other and to smash their own university, that’s their business.”

Some readers, I am sure, are thinking that the correct stand would have been one of strict neutrality, which would mean abstaining from voting in senate, or even absenting oneself from senate meetings. An American actually did this, and one result of his “non-stand” was predictable: nobody on either side respected his position. It was as if both sides said, “To take no side is to say that you do not care what happens to the university.” Why did not more assume the neutral position? I think the answer lay in something that the Nigerians, especially those on council, did not understand and, probably, few people in developing countries anywhere understand. Fifty men gave up temporarily their careers at home
to help found something new and something they hoped would be first class. All the indications were that the University of Lagos was going to be first class. Most of these foreigners were interested in their own academic reputations as well as the reputation of the new university. In fact, one enhances the other. What these men found at Lagos pleased them, and morale was high under the leadership of Eni Njoku. When council tried to change the leadership of the university, there was a feeling of resentment and a drop in morale. No one wanted to be associated academically with an institution that had lost its autonomy to a political party. Academic reputations could suffer through association with such an institution. It is not difficult for us to see why senate took a firm stand, but to many Nigerians it was just a case of neo-colonialism.

The University of Lagos crisis was a true case of interference with the autonomy of an institution from outside the institution, but the form of the struggle made it appear to be an internal fight, a lay council versus an academic senate. In fact, the university was betrayed from within by the very men who had been appointed to be its protectors, the council. The idea of loyalty to the university came second to their loyalty to tribe and political party. The fact that it appeared to be an internal struggle made it easy for the Prime Minister to maintain his policy of non-interference. And the Minister of Education, Richard Akinjide (who was personally up to his neck in the plot to replace Njoku), made the most of this point. When the Government was formally asked by senate to mediate the dispute, Akinjide replied (and in retrospect I find this very amusing) that the Government could not interfere because it would not be in keeping with the respect the Government had for the autonomy of the university!

Expatriate Problems

I am sure that none of the expatriates made his decision to support Njoku on any other grounds than what seemed to be best for the university. I made my decision at the beginning, and that decision was to stand and be counted on the side of God and the Angels. Accordingly, throughout the crisis I voted consistently in senate for an ideal that I and most of my confreres held, that a university, even in a developing country, perhaps especially in a developing country, should be free of political interference, and
especially in Nigeria where the principle of non-interference was accepted as public policy by the Government and enshrined in the constitutions of the federal universities. There were, of course, times when I had doubts, and I think anyone with a commitment to the university would have had doubts at some time or other, especially when it appeared that the Nigerians were prepared to destroy the university through the passions of tribalism. However, we all felt that it was the duty of staff to try to build an institution based on the ideals of the planners and, indeed, of the people of Nigeria, who expected the university to be an institution of which they could be proud in the eyes of the world. But it is possible to be so idealistic that you kill what you are trying to save.

One aspect of the crisis that worried me a little was the matter of my relationship to my indirect employer, the Canadian Government. To what extent were all of us embarrassing our respective governments? I think the answer lies in the extent to which any one of our governments looked upon its foreign aid as an extension of its foreign policy and influence in the host country. No less an authority than Lester Pearson said on CBC radio recently that there was not the slightest doubt in his mind that much of the foreign aid given by the developed to the developing countries in the last few years had its origin in ulterior motives. It is the policy of any donor country to make aid as palatable to the host country as possible in order to build and maintain friendship. Such a policy, of course, can mean the sacrifice of principle in the interests of expediency. I should imagine that countries like Canada and Sweden have less of a political axe to grind than have major powers, and their foreign aid is, therefore, probably more purely altruistic. It is pleasant to be able to report that at no time during those harrowing five months did the Canadian High Commissioner in Lagos ever suggest that I do other than my conscience dictated. The same attitude was taken by the External Aid Office at Ottawa. They watched what was going on, but took the attitude that if at any time I felt I could not do an effective job in the university, I was free either to return to Canada or (as actually happened) to accept a university post in another developing country.

Quite different was the treatment accorded the Dean of Engineering, who held a UNESCO appointment. One did not gain the impression that the UNESCO people in Paris had much of an idea of what the issues were in Lagos, and it was the impression of
many of us that they were so afraid of offending someone that they would sacrifice their own man to keep the peace. Certainly, when the Nigerian Minister of Education tried to expel the Dean of Engineering from the country on a few hours notice, it was the Prime Minister of Nigeria who stopped the expulsion, and not at the request of UNESCO. It is possible that UNESCO later made an official protest, but none of us in Nigeria at the time was ever made aware of the fact if they did. As a consequence, it is likely that UNESCO representatives can expect to receive rougher treatment in developing countries than would someone looking to Ottawa or Stockholm for protection.

Some Variables

There seem to be two major areas of concern which will influence your actions in an overseas university: first, the circumstances of your appointment and, second, the circumstances you find yourself in after your arrival. My appointment was indirect in that I remained on the staff of McGill University, being seconded to Lagos with Ottawa reimbursing McGill. This is probably the most favourable condition under which one can teach overseas. In addition to the obvious advantage of having your fringe-benefit program uninterrupted, your university tends to act as an insulation between you and the possibility of unfair treatment at the hands of bureaucracy in Ottawa. The fact that you are still on the staff of a Canadian university brings to your defence, if you need it, all the weight of your university and of the Canadian Association of University Teachers.

A number of my colleagues were teaching at Lagos on direct appointment. They may have answered an advertisement placed in the Times Educational Supplement by the overseas university, and accepted the university's offer of a position under, probably, certain favourable conditions. These people are absolutely free agents, and when they get into trouble, they are on their own. This type of appointment is very risky, especially if wives and children are involved, because in spite of what the contract says, many African countries can and will "Africanize" your position or deport you from the country if they feel it is politically desirable and politically safe to do so. A number of the Lagos staff were British, some probably recruited by the Inter-University Council, with direct appointments, but with their salaries "topped-up" by the Ministry of
Overseas Development. These people were fairly vulnerable because
the major part of their salaries came from the host country, where­
as I was not dependent on the University of Lagos for anything
except housing. I think it took much more courage on their part
to resign in July, with uncertain prospects for September, than it
did for me.

The second major area has to do with the conditions in your
host university and country. The universities of tropical Africa
vary greatly in their constitutions as regards autonomy of the
institution and autonomy of the staff in academic matters. One
of the reasons I felt bound to support the fight for autonomy at
Lagos was that the letter and spirit of the university constitution
promised autonomy. We were fighting against the idea that a group
of people could subvert the university by unethical means from what
it was planned to be. Some universities (e.g. Nsukka) do not pro­
vide these guarantees in their constitutions, and in such uni­
versities I think a foreigner would be very foolish to try to change
the structure and philosophy of the institution. Such action might,
with justification, be termed “neo-colonialist.”

There is a good chance that the position you occupy in a
university in a developing country will determine the likelihood of
your becoming a storm-centre or not. If you simply teach and
conduct your own research, you can melt into the background like
an African chameleon. However, if you hold a chair or are dean of
a faculty, you are a likely candidate for a confrontation about once
a week, and a major crisis every six months. I believe that UNESCO
staff do not now take administrative appointments in these uni­
versities (probably since Lagos), simply to avoid the possibility of
confrontations.

Clearly, one cannot hope to find academic conditions abroad
exactly as they are at home. I do not think it makes too much sense
to argue that a university staff belongs to an international associa­
tion of freemasons who cannot teach without enjoying all the free­
doms of an English don in a centuries-old university in a calm and
peaceful country.

You have volunteered to teach overseas, you have tried to de­
termine as exactly as possible the conditions under which you will
teach, and you are prepared to make adjustments (provided they do
not compromise your academic reputation). And having done all
that you could reasonably be expected to do before taking your family to Tombouctou, including satisfying yourself that the sun in Africa really rises in the east, do not be surprised if one fine morning the African sun rises in the west!

References

1. There are a total of five universities in this country, which is about the size of the Province of Ontario, and which has a population almost three times that of Canada. One of the three regional universities (the University of Nigeria at Nsukka and Enugu) is closed because of the civil war.
3. The announcement was especially surprising because only a few days earlier Dr. Biobaku had announced that he had accepted the vice-chancellorship of the University of Zambia.
4. The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) was primarily a Yoruba, Western Region party, based in Ibadan.
8. In January of 1964 six expatriate members of the teaching staff of the University of Ghana (Legon) were expelled by the Government on charges of subversive activities. Two of these men later accepted appointments at Lagos. One of them told me that he had been offered a rather handsome sum of money by a representative of Kwame Nkrumah “to forget about it.”
11. I am not in favour of a weak-kneed approach to recipient countries. Their claim that only they know best what is good for them is not, in my opinion, true. I once asked an American how he ascertained when a country really had a problem. He replied that if they said they had a problem, as far as he was concerned, they had a problem! When great quantities of men and money are poured into a recipient country we should insist on more control.